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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Recent Progress in Asia

Remarks by John M. Allison

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

QUESTION: Let us begin with the general question—Mr. Allison, would you say conditions in Asia today are better or worse than they were, say, a year ago?

MR. ALLISON: On the whole I believe conditions in Asia are better today than they were a year ago. There are, of course, still dark spots. There are situations such as in Korea and Indochina where actual fighting is taking place and where we cannot see clearly at this time just what the end will be. However, if we look at the whole area of Asia there are, I believe, many things to point to which show that progress has been made.

First, a year ago we had just signed the Japanese peace treaty. Since then it has gone into effect, and Japan is again taking her place as a free, independent and equal member of the family of nations. This, I believe, is extremely important, for the contribution which the 80 million vigorous Japanese can make to the welfare of Asia is inestimable.

Formosa is getting stronger. The Government on Formosa is making real strides in economic and social progress and the people of Formosa are getting progressively a larger share in the Government. American economic and military aid is flowing into the island in increasing quantities, and whereas a year or a year and a half ago there was a definite threat of invasion from the mainland, that does not seem imminent today.

In the Philippines we have seen vast improvement in the security situation. A year ago there were many parts of the islands, some close to Manila, where it was not safe to travel at night. Today, you can travel almost anywhere with little or no danger.

A year ago the pessimists told us that Burma was likely to fall by default into Communist hands because of internal weaknesses. Today, the

Burmese Government is in a stronger position than it has been since it achieved its independence. Popular elections have been held for the first time, and the Government returned to power with a large majority. Active steps have been taken by the Government against the Communists within Burma and the effective writ of the Burmese Government has been extended far beyond the borders of Rangoon itself.

A year ago hardly a start had been made toward developing any sort of collective security system in the Pacific. We had just signed a security treaty with Japan, a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and a mutual security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Today, all of those security and defense treaties have been ratified and have gone into effect, and we have had the first meeting of the Council [ANZUS Council] provided for in the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty, and it has set up procedures for implementing that pact.

QUESTION: In that connection, Mr. Allison, tell us more about this meeting at Honolulu, the ANZUS meeting. There seems to be considerable worry in some quarters regarding the fact that this was a "white man's meeting" and that no Asian nations were invited to Honolulu. What can you tell us about this?

Background of Anzus Meeting

MR. ALLISON: There has been considerable misunderstanding and confusion regarding the meeting last month at Honolulu of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Many people seem to think that this meeting was suddenly decided upon, that the United States, out of the blue as it were, realized a need for some sort of Pacific pact and that we then invited just Australia and New Zealand to a meeting to discuss the problem. That is very far from the truth. As I said, the treaty with Australia

¹ Made over CBS's "The Asia Story" program on Sept. 14 (press release no. 727 dated Sept. 12).

and New Zealand was signed over a year ago. It was one of three similar treaties, all concluded at about the same time as the Japanese peace treaty and all of them with that peace treaty making what we thought of in the Department of State as the total Japanese peace settlement.

The ANZUS Council meeting at Honolulu was not an isolated event. It was held merely to bring into effect the provisions of the treaty with Australia and New Zealand. There are only three parties to that particular treaty, and because of this there obviously could not be invited other powers unless all three agreed that this should be done.

This treaty was one of several treaties making up the Japanese peace settlement. The United States took the lead in bringing about a treaty of peace with Japan which was not punitive and which was based on trust and a spirit of reconciliation. It was believed that this treaty should be nonrestrictive and that in the treaty itself it would not be possible to seek certainty about Japan's future actions by imposing restrictions which would deny freedom to Japan.

The peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were much closer to Japanese aggression than we were, and there was a natural reluctance in those countries to think in terms of a peace treaty with Japan that would not make impossible by its own terms the resurgence of Japanese aggression. If the Governments of those countries were to join with the United States in the type of Japanese peace treaty which we believed essential, they had to be able to give their people assurances about their future security.

As a result of the conclusion of these mutual security and defense treaties they were able to do so. But these treaties do not look only to the past, they are the basis for hope in the future. The best description of the real purpose of these security pacts has been given by John Foster Dulles, who was in charge of their negotiation, when he stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of concern for our Pacific allies of World War II or lack of desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them for security. The security treaties with these three countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate the old war, but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war.

We have tried to make it clear that the meeting at Honolulu last month was not a meeting of a Pacific pact and that the Council set up is not a Pacific council. We even went to some trouble to coin a new word, "ANZUS," to describe this Council and to make sure that no one would think that this Council was one which would decide the problems of the whole Pacific area. As President Truman said, when it was announced in April of

1951 that these treaties were to be concluded, they are "initial steps" in the formation of an over-all security system for the Pacific. We have found that it is not possible at this time to have a Pacific pact in the same sense that we have a North Atlantic Pact. When you stop to look for a minute at the countries of Asia you will readily see why this is so. In Europe, members of the North Atlantic Pact have, generally speaking, common problems, complementary economies, and have all reached approximately the same level of political, economic, and social development. That is not so in Asia. Here we have countries ranging from crown colonies and satrapies such as Borneo to modern industrialized Japan. We have countries such as Japan and Thailand which have been independent for centuries. We have other countries like Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines which have only achieved full independence in the last 6 years. We have some of the countries of Asia which still recognize the National Government of China as the only legitimate Chinese Government. We have others who recognize the Communist regime as the legitimate government of China. We have countries such as the Philippines which are willing to align themselves publicly on the side of the West. We have other countries, particularly the newer ones such as Burma and Indonesia, who say that their first task is to put their own house in order and they wish to be left alone to do that and do not wish to take sides in the world struggle at this time.

Foundation Laid for Pacific Pact

With all these diversities, the time has not yet come when we can have a single over-all Pacific pact. But in my personal opinion that time will come, and when it does and when the people of Asia make clear that they wish to work together to insure their free development and to help each other maintain their independence, then the United States will be ready and willing to play its part in helping them to do so. The "initial steps" such as the ANZUS pact, our mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and our security pact with Japan, can be the foundation for this greater cooperation.

QUESTION: Well that naturally, Mr. Allison, brings us to the subject of neutralism in Asia of which we hear so much. Do you think there is such a thing as a real neutral out there?

MR. ALLISON: I think it is only natural for us to expect neutralism in an area where new countries are just getting on their feet. My own feeling is that these countries are more neutral in what they say than in what they do. All of the countries of Asia outside of the mainland of China have in one way or another demonstrated by action that they wish to remain free and independent and that they do not wish to be the slaves of any foreign *ism*. They are all, I would say,

non-Communist if not actively anti-Communist. I think before we judge too hastily we should remember our own experience and recall that it took two world wars before the people of this country realized that in today's world one cannot long remain neutral. However, this is not something we can tell the peoples of Burma and Indonesia. They must decide this matter for themselves. It is important to emphasize that it is not America, it is not the free nations of the world, that say neutralism is impossible, but it is the Communists who say it everyday and in every way. They said it again as recently as last December when, in the Moscow University *Herald*, the Communists set forth a seven-point program forming in fact a blueprint of Communist aggression in the East. It begins with instructions to incite the peoples of the East to nationalism, something which obviously they all are interested in. They are then told to promote a "united front," and the various steps are outlined to the point where the Communist Party seizes complete control and ousts all others. Point 6 in this seven-point program is worthy of special mention. It says: "Remember that true national independence can be achieved only in unity with the Soviet Union. There is no third, middle or neutral road."

QUESTION: How does the American Government define Russian objectives in Asia?

Mr. ALLISON: I don't think it is as important, Mr. Costello, to know how the American Government defines Russian objectives as it is to know how the Soviet Government defines those objectives. The Communists have made no secret of their interest in the Far East, and what they are trying to do has been made clear for all who will read and understand. I have just mentioned the seven-point program outlined in the Moscow University *Herald* of last December in an article commenting upon the lessons to be learned from China about advancing the revolution. We know that this interest of the world Communist leaders is of long standing although it has taken its most aggressive form in recent years. Almost 30 years ago, in his lectures on the foundation of Leninism, Stalin pointed out that "The road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism." Stalin has also said that with Japan, Russia would be invincible. It seems then that we can learn from the lips of the Russians themselves what are their main objectives in Asia. One is to promote world revolution through revolutionary activity in the East, and two, to get Japan into the Communist camp if possible, or at least to weaken it so that it can be no danger to the Soviets. In my opinion, one of the reasons for the Communist aggression in Korea was to make more easy the eventual conquest of Japan. With the Soviets already in the

Kuriles to the north of Japan, possession of the Korean Peninsula by a Communist-dominated state would place Japan in the grip of Soviet pincers and make it difficult for the people of Japan to maintain real independence.

QUESTION: Would you say Communist imperialism today is a more immediate threat in Asia or in Europe, and do you think the young nations of Asia would be willing and able to defend themselves in the event of a Communist attack?

Mr. ALLISON: In my opinion, Communist imperialism is a greater immediate threat in Asia than in Europe. Through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact the free nations of Europe have built up strength to such a position that it would be difficult for the Communist aggressors to make further gains without engaging in all-out war. This is not yet true in the Far East. As I have said, there is wide divergence among the countries of Asia in political, economic, and social development. Many of the new countries are just beginning to reach stability. They have many problems still unsolved, and because of many years of colonialism they do not yet have a sufficient number of trained leaders. It is easy for communism to spread chaos in Asia, and that is why it seems to me the greater threat is there. The second part of your question implies a situation which may not develop. You ask would the young nations of Asia be willing and able to defend themselves in the event of Communist attack. It seems to me Communist attack in the conventional sense may never come but that the greatest danger is constant pressure, subversion, and infiltration whereby the new and weak governments of Asia can be kept weak, can be kept divided among themselves. The seeds of dissatisfaction are being sown in these countries in the hope that they will almost imperceptibly drift into the Communist camp. That is the danger which we are facing, that is what we are trying to fight against by helping these countries to help themselves through our economic and military aid programs. At the two points in Asia where there is definite Communist military aggression, in Korea and Indochina, the peoples of those areas have shown that they are willing and able to fight, but they need help, and that help we are giving them.

QUESTION: In the past American attention has centered more on Europe than on Asia—in a sense it now becomes something of a political issue—but would you say that it is fair to conclude that it is our policy to treat Asians as "second-class expendables"?

Mr. ALLISON: I have no desire on this program to get into any political argument, but I think it is possible to look at what we have done and are doing in Asia, and if we do, I believe we will see that it is not the U.S. Government which looks on Asians as "second-class expendables."

U. S. Policy in Asia

For 7 years the United States bore the main burden of the occupation of Japan. Not only did we do much to eliminate the vestiges of the old Japanese militarism, but we spent nearly 2 billion dollars to help feed the Japanese and make it possible for them to raise their war-shattered standard of living. The United States took the lead under the energetic and imaginative guidance of John Foster Dulles, but with the strong backing of President Truman and Secretary Acheson, in giving the Japanese people a liberal peace treaty enabling them to take their place in the world community as equal partners. The treaty made them completely free. We have signed a security treaty with Japan and are keeping U. S. Forces in that country in order to defend the Japanese against attack, as for the present they have no adequate defense force of their own. Is that the treatment normally given to "second-class expendables"?

When Communist aggressors invaded the Republic of Korea we, along with other members of the United Nations, took immediate action. Since then U. S. casualties in Korea up to July 25 of this year have exceeded 113,000, including over 18,000 dead. We are spending approximately 5 billion dollars a year for Korea, not including troop pay, food, or training costs, and, in addition, we have given over 700 million dollars of economic aid to the people of Korea. We have refused to agree to an armistice in Korea, although that meant continuing loss of American and other free nations' blood and treasure, on terms which would force Koreans and Chinese to return to Communist slavery and probable death.

In the Philippines, as a result of the Bell Mission Report and the Quirino-Foster Agreement, the United States has been carrying on a program of economic aid envisaging the expenditure of 250 million dollars over a 5-year period. This is in addition to the large sum—almost a billion dollars—which we have contributed to repair the damages of war in the Philippines. In addition to this economic aid, we have military agreements with the Government of the Philippines making clear that the American people have not forgotten what the Philippine people did between 1941 and 1945, and making clear that if trouble should come to the Philippines again they would not stand alone.

In Formosa, the United States has a military and economic aid program involving the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. Our Seventh Fleet makes certain that any Communist aggression against Formosa shall not succeed. It will continue to do so.

In Indochina, the French and the peoples of the three Associated States are carrying the chief burden—it is not often realized that France has spent more in Indochina than she received through Marshall Plan aid, that for the last 7 years one-third of France's professional armed forces have

been engaged in Indochina, and that France is now spending more than a billion dollars a year defending that area. For our part, the United States is contributing approximately one-third of the cost of the Indochina operation. In addition, we maintain there a military advisory mission to assist in equipping the National Armies of the three Associated States and the French Union Army.

In Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, there are smaller programs of economic aid. In the case of Thailand there is also a program of military aid and a military advisory group.

When we look at the Far East from Japan and Korea, down through Formosa, the Philippines, to Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, American blood or treasure (in Korea both) is being poured out with that of other free nations to help keep those countries secure from Communist aggression—actual or potential—and to give them an opportunity to develop as free and independent nations. Would these more than 100,000 American casualties and billions of American dollars have been sacrificed for people whom we considered "second-class expendables"? I think not.

But what of Russia? What is its ultimate purpose in Asia? To make the nations of Asia free? No. Remember Stalin said the East was the road to victory in the West—that is what they are interested in. They are attempting to use the people of Asia to achieve that victory. It is the Soviets—it is the Communists—who really believe the people of Asia are "second-class expendables." There have not been 100,000 Soviet casualties on behalf of their North Korean and Chinese Communist friends. No—they let them spend their own blood.

Communist Motives for Delaying Korean Armistice Agreement

Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, chief United Nations negotiator at the Panmunjom armistice talks, made the following statement to Communist negotiators on September 6:

Another week has passed and you continue to reject an armistice, insisting as its price that we return to you a few thousand Chinese prisoners who are determined never again to live under Communist control at any cost. We have offered you the opportunity to verify the attitude of those prisoners. You have refused to do so.

Let us consider dispassionately the obvious consequences of your continued delay in agreeing to an armistice. First, you are preventing the repatriation of about 83,000 of your captured personnel who will not violently resist.

Second, you force the continuation of the military conflict. The battleground is North Korea,

since you have failed to conquer and occupy the Republic of Korea. The people whose land is the battleground of the contending forces always suffer. North Korea is a small country, economically poor. Its people have already suffered much from the 2 years of conflict. Its economic life is gradually being destroyed as a result of your continued use of its area and facilities for the operations and support of your military forces.

The facts we have just stated are clear to all the world. It is inevitable that intelligent and decent people everywhere draw conclusions from these facts, conclusions regarding your purposes and methods. If you stop to consider what such opinions must be, you will see that delay in agreeing to an armistice works to your disadvantage.

First, let us examine the matter of those few thousand Chinese prisoners of war. They are just ordinary men, most of them of the lowest grade of your army. By entering into this conflict in Korea you have sent to death or serious injury many thousands of others like them. By continuing the fighting after your military invasion has failed you condemn still others to death. It is difficult to evade the thought that this loss of life stirs little regret in your minds. This inference immediately leads to a question. Why should these few thousand Chinese fear to return to their homeland? Why should men flee from their country, willing to go anywhere else in the world, but not to return to the control of their own rulers.

Civilized rulers allow their people to emigrate to other countries. You would have us force yours to come back to you at bayonet point. It is difficult for us to escape giving credence to reports which arise from many sources that you are afraid to have your people learn how much better are conditions in non-Communist countries for those masses of the population whom you call the proletariat. Possibly the other stories which we hear are true, that you intend to punish those who seek to escape from Communist control. If this information is accurate, you may as well recognize now that there is no possibility that we will force to be repatriated those who have begged us for asylum.

There may be still another reason for your continued insistence in making the forced repatriation of a few thousand Chinese the issue which delays or may prevent an armistice. There is a widely held suspicion that you really do not desire an armistice and that your negotiations are mere camouflage to conceal your real purpose to continue the conflict. If this suspicion ultimately proves to be true, the world will have discovered once again and beyond any doubt the futility of attempting to negotiate with Communists on any reasonable and honorable grounds.

The Chinese prisoners concerned are few in number. To recover them it appears that you are satisfied to cause the population of North Korea to suffer the gradual destruction of its economic life in addition to hunger, disease, dislocations of

homes, and other troubles which are the inevitable consequences of the military operations which you force them to support and maintain. These poor people are your so called "proletariat." The world asks you: "Have you no feeling of compassion for these people? Do their lives, homes, and happiness mean nothing to you?"

It is difficult to understand how the Communist rulers of North Korea can continue to support Communist Chinese demands while their own country and people suffer such great loss. In civilized countries governments are not indifferent to the needs of their people. In fact, much of your propaganda talks loudly about the good you seek to do for your countrymen. How can you expect anyone outside of communism, or in it for that matter, to believe other than that you are cruelly indifferent to your people, or that you are mere puppets of an alien Communist ruler, obedient to your master's command?

Naturally we do not expect you to answer, or admit the accuracy of these conclusions. But they are really inescapable as you will see if you stop to consider the matter from a logical and humane point of view. Everyday the atmosphere is filled with your propaganda. But propaganda uses words only. All of us know that actions speak much louder than words. People may believe off repeated propaganda until they learn that it is false in fact; that the truth is just the opposite of the words. For some years now and as a result of Communist acts, not words, the people of the world have been increasingly recognizing the falseness of communism. Is the further delay of the armistice to become just another of these lessons teaching men to distrust and resist everything said or done by Communist rulers? We leave the answer to you.

If you are prepared to agree to an armistice we are ready to exchange lists of prisoners of war to be repatriated in accord with paragraph 51 of the draft armistice agreement. We have approximately 83,000 whom we can repatriate. You have stated often that you are prepared to repatriate all of our personnel in your custody, who now number over 12,000. If your list is in conformity with your past statements there should be no difficulty in reaching an armistice agreement.

U.S. Facing Renewed Communist Germ Warfare Charges

Press release 732 dated September 15

The United States is once more faced with a new spate of phony evidence of bacteriological warfare in Korea and China. This time we are informed that an international commission of scientists has conducted an investigation and has come up with proof of the charges which the Com-

munist propaganda organs have been spreading around the world since last winter.

The Government of the United States has denied these charges repeatedly. It has repeatedly offered to submit them to impartial investigation. In each instance, the Communist powers have refused to permit an investigation by any body or organization which was not completely subservient to them.

Instead, they have produced a steady barrage of so-called evidence, prefabricated from plans drawn in Moscow, by persons whose allegiance to the Communist cause outweighs their regard for truth and decency.

This latest report is no exception. Peiping Radio acknowledges that the impetus for this so-called investigation came from the World Peace Council. The World Peace Council is the foremost Communist front organization in the field of propaganda. It is distinguished by its complete subservience to the Moscow line in all fields of endeavor. The personnel of the so-called International Commission of Scientists was selected by Communist leaders; they were conducted on their tour by Communist officials; and they have written their report under Communist aegis.

The United States stands before the tribunal of world opinion with clean hands. It has repeatedly signified its willingness to submit to a genuine investigation, asking only that the investigation be impartial and conducted by qualified personnel.

This has been the American stand in discussion of this question with other powers. It was the American position before the organs of the United Nations. It was the American position at the 18th International Red Cross Conference, where Communist delegates sought to inundate the conferees with propaganda concerning these charges. When the Red Cross Conference adopted a resolution urging the powers involved to agree upon an impartial investigation, the chief U. S. delegate immediately and publicly welcomed the action of the Conference.

The Communist leaders continue to turn a conveniently deaf ear to all proposals for a genuine inquiry. Instead, they substitute the alleged findings of their stooges, based upon lies, trumped-up evidence, and forced confessions.

U.S. Views on General Assembly Discussion of Korean Issue

Press release 731 dated September 15

Certain confusion appears to have arisen in the public mind concerning the relationship of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom and the discussions of the Korean issue which may be expected in the U.N. General Assembly.

Since the establishment of the Republic of

Korea, the United Nations has had a broad and general interest in the political and economic development of a unified Korea. These problems have been discussed in various meetings of the General Assembly since that time and will undoubtedly be discussed in the forthcoming session at New York.

As distinct from these general considerations, the United States, in consultation with other principally concerned countries, has assumed the responsibility, as part of the military mission assigned to it by the United Nations Security Council, for the conduct of the negotiations with the Communists for a military armistice. It continues to be the view of the U.S. Government that this is the proper and appropriate means of conducting these negotiations.

Secretary Acheson Comments on New Sino-Soviet Agreement

Printed below is an account of remarks regarding the new Chinese-Soviet agreement made by Secretary Acheson at his press conference on September 17.¹ When asked by a correspondent whether anything could be added to a comment made the previous day on the matter by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, Secretary Acheson answered in the following vein:

He had been looking that morning at a copy of a memorandum of the press and radio news conference of the 15th of February 1950, where, he said, they had discussed together the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Government, and that there were some things there that might be interesting to recall.

Secretary Acheson recalled that at the beginning of his comment he had pointed out that there might very well have been and probably were agreements which were not reduced to writing and perhaps would not be, and that he had added that undoubtedly more would come out from time to time. He had said that he thought that that was very probably the case, and that all of what had been done would never come out in printed form. The Secretary reminded the correspondents that he had commented that that would develop, if at all, out of the conduct of the Soviet Union over the next months and perhaps years, because one of the most familiar patterns known

¹ The agreement, whose terms were announced at Moscow on Sept. 15, provides that the Changchun Railway will be returned to the control of the Chinese Communist regime but that Russian forces will continue to be maintained at Port Arthur. The agreement relates to a treaty made in Feb. 1950 between the two countries; the latter provided that Russia was to return both the railway and Port Arthur to the Chinese Communist regime by the end of 1952.

was that most of the agreements made by the Soviet Union had their most important provisions in secret protocols.

The Secretary continued by saying that he had said that this treaty referred to eagerness of the parties to it to agree with the rest of the world on a Japanese peace treaty, and that he had commented that that had not been demonstrated in an outstanding manner over the recent past because so far we had not been able to agree with them on the procedure within which to discuss a treaty.

Secretary Acheson also recalled that a correspondent had commented that the Chinese Nationalists seemed to think that there was something significant in the selection of the date 1952 for the Russian evacuation of Port Arthur and, of course, that that year was important from other points of view. The correspondent had then inquired if it was possible to state if the Department had any information that would give any particular significance to the year 1952. The Secretary said that he had answered in the negative and had stated that he had no information of any sort on that, saying that it had the happy result of putting it off quite a while. The Secretary then had added that the Soviet Union had been in occupation of those areas; that a great many things might happen before 1952 which could prolong the period and that even if they did not happen, there again Soviet influence would be so solidified that by the time one took away the ostensible troops, control would be quite firmly established.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he thought that that had been an interesting comment of more than 2 years ago and that we were seeing some of it coming out now.

U.S. Encouraged by European Unity Efforts

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

Press release 736 dated September 17

During the past week we have witnessed two closely connected events which have far-reaching significance for the future of free Europe. The first was the initial meeting of the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. The second was the decision by this Assembly to study immediately the formation of a European Political Authority.

It is not possible at this time to predict where these studies will lead, nor to anticipate the nature and scope of the political structure which may be created. The important fact is that this decision demonstrates, perhaps more forcibly than any action yet taken, the strength and momentum of the movement toward European unity.

The United States will continue to encourage and support the efforts of the statesmen and peoples of Europe to achieve a close and enduring unity because we are convinced that this unity will contribute substantially to the strength and prosperity of our European friends and to the success of our mutual efforts to maintain peace in the world.

Department Publication on Forced Labor in U.S.S.R.

Statement by the President

White House press release dated September 18

Most of you are probably aware that the United Nations has been investigating the practice of forced labor and the United States has been most anxious that the facts be made known. I therefore want to call to your attention today this factual exposé of forced labor in the Soviet Union and its satellites which was compiled by the Department of State.¹ It contains many vivid examples of what it means to live under the present Soviet rulers and indicates the scope of this practice in the Russian sphere and its economic and political significance.

With the urging and support of labor organizations, particularly American labor and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the United States and Great Britain requested the United Nations to investigate forced labor wherever it exists in the world. As a result, the United Nations created a special committee headed by an outstanding Indian leader, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar. This committee held hearings in New York in June and will continue its investigation in Geneva beginning October 14. The U.S. Government made available to the U.N. committee such evidence as it had of forced labor in the Soviet sphere. The State Department has summarized all these facts in this booklet.

¹For excerpts from this publication, *Forced Labor in the Soviet Union*, Department of State publication 4716, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 428.

Disarmament and Technical Assistance: The Way to a Better Life

Address by Durward V. Sandifer

Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs¹

The occasion of this great Centennial of Engineering recalls the remarkable degree to which engineering and technology have in the past century succeeded in overcoming obstacles standing in the way of a better life. Your success has opened a vast and undreamed of prospect for mankind—a prospect almost terrifying in its potentiality for good or evil, depending on the road which mankind takes. That is where your calling and mine join, for those of us who work in the field of diplomacy are acutely aware of our responsibility to assist in finding the road which leads to peace and security, to the fuller enjoyment of the fruits of your labors. This is a responsibility which we share with you. That is why I am happy to join in welcoming those of you who are visiting from other countries and to wish you a pleasant and profitable stay.

No one knows better than you the terrible necessity for bringing to effective political control the weapons of destruction with which men have periodically slaughtered each other. Perhaps international anarchy and the persistence of the dueling code among nations were tolerable in the days of the battle-ax, the sword, and the spear, or even in the day of the rifle and long-range artillery.

But it is unthinkable in the age of atomic bombs, atomic weapons, hydrogen bombs, guided missiles, and jet planes. We have moved from the day when wars could only be carried out by killing in hand-to-hand combat into the day when one man in a jet bomber with a few assistants can destroy a city. Man must subject these engines of destruction to mutual world control or perish. Others may dismiss this as a dramatic figure of speech. You engineers cannot escape the knowledge of its awful reality.

I am reminded of an incident which took place during the question period after an address made by Dr. Einstein several years ago. A feminine

listener said to Dr. Einstein: "What weapons will be used in the third world war?" Einstein replied: "Madam, I cannot answer that question, but I can tell you what weapons will be used in the fourth world war. Rocks!"

While we strive to control destruction, we must at the same time press forward the construction of a better way of life.

The United Nations offers the best hope man has developed to date for mastering both of these tremendous problems. But it is only to the extent that it finds a way to use your engineering know-how that this hope can be made real. The build-up of armaments for security, the technical knowledge essential to safe disarmament, the prosecution of a technical assistance program—all depend for successful execution upon the body of knowledge represented by your profession. Engineering and multilateral diplomacy effectively linked offer the world hope of peace and a better life.

An Apparent Inconsistency

It may seem inconsistent to you for the United States and the United Nations to devote time and energy to disarmament when at the same time we are bending every effort to achieve a vast rearmament program on our part and that of our allies. Actually, the two programs are not inconsistent. President Truman, in explaining the significance of the disarmament proposals which were advanced in the U.N. General Assembly by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, reaffirmed the determination of the United States to win real peace, based on freedom and justice.² He said that we will do it the hard way if we must, by making the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But the United States will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the

¹ Made at the Centennial of Engineering celebration at the Museum of Science and Industry at Chicago on Sept. 3.

² For the President's address, made Nov. 7, 1951, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 799.

armaments that make aggression possible. That is why we have made these disarmament proposals in the United Nations and why we shall continue to seek workable agreements on disarmament.

A disarmed world must rest upon two basic principles. They are tersely stated in the "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program," presented by the United States to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on April 24.³ In the first place, "the goal of disarmament is not to regulate, but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations." Secondly, in order to achieve this goal "all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world"—a world "in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war," and "in which no state will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending state could start a war."

What we have been doing in the Disarmament Commission since its organization in February pursuant to the Disarmament Resolution adopted by the General Assembly last fall is trying to put meat on the bare bones of these propositions.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and France have presented a concrete program to the Disarmament Commission in a series of four papers. This program stems from the basic premise that an effective system of inspection and control is essential to any safe disarmament program. The plan starts, therefore, and must start with the proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. We must know in the beginning and at all times exactly what armaments every nation has. This disclosure and verification would be carried out in a series of stages, each stage to follow when the previous one had been satisfactorily completed. But even the first stage would include important information. For example, the disclosures in the atomic field would give a clear indication of existing atomic strength—our own and that of other countries. Most important of all, disclosure and verification would be carried out by an international organ with full authority to guarantee faithful performance by all states.

Next, the program envisages a progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to maximum levels, radically lower than present levels.

The essence of our proposal for fixing numerical limits on armed forces is the suggestion that there should be maximum ceilings for the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China, which should be, say, between 1,000,000

and 1,500,000 men; that the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

In addition, there would be agreed maximum ceilings for all other states having substantial armed forces, fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. The ceilings to be aimed at would normally be less than one percent of the population and would normally be less than current levels.

The numerical limitations proposed are flexible, and are not intended to be final or exhaustive. They are offered not as fixed limitations but as tentative standards to serve as a basis for negotiation.

These numerical limitation proposals stress one of our fundamental objectives in the disarmament field. We would eliminate as far as possible the danger of resort to war by reducing the practicability of successful aggression. Genuine enforcement of agreed levels of armaments would prevent the excessive concentration of power which has always been such a threat to peace and security.

Five Power Conference Proposed

Next, as a means of implementing these proposals, we have suggested that when we can get agreement on some of the basic ideas, the representatives of the Five Great Powers should get together to seek agreement on three particular points: How they would allocate their permitted armed forces among their respective armed services; what armaments and how much of them they would consider necessary and appropriate to support these limited armed forces; and how they would prohibit and eliminate all armed forces and all armaments other than those expressly permitted. This might be followed by regional conferences including all other governments having substantial military forces, in order to reach similar agreement on the over-all numerical ceilings for their armed forces and on the three problems which I have just mentioned. The drafting of treaties on the basis of agreements thus reached would follow. Again the international control authority is central to the plan with full power to insure the carrying out of the limitations, reductions, and prohibitions.

Finally, an essential part of this comprehensive disarmament plan is the system for atomic energy control. Until a better or no less effective system is devised, we continue to support the U.N. plan approved by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations in the General Assembly of 1948. This plan was the product of the most thorough study in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. It calls for the elimination of atomic weapons through an iron-clad system of international control to insure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

That is but a brief sketch of what, I submit, is a major and sincere effort by the United States, the

³ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1952, p. 752.

United Kingdom, and France to promote disarmament—an effort which has received general support from all members of the Disarmament Commission except the Soviet Union. What is the record of the Soviet Union?

The Soviet Record

The Soviet Government rejects out of hand all these proposals. It offers nothing in their place but the discredited program decisively rejected by the General Assembly in Paris and in previous sessions of the General Assembly, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other U.N. bodies. That is an immediate prohibition of the use of atomic energy and a reduction by one-third of the armaments of the Big Five—this without the institution of any effective system for the inspection and control of armaments. They talk about an organ for the control of disarmament, but one which would not have the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state. They would rob us of our principal weapon of defense against aggression while leaving substantially intact their great mass armies with their existing ratio of superiority over the armies of other countries—and even this without any guarantees of compliance or enforcement. As our representatives have repeatedly declared, we will not accept mere paper guarantees. We will entrust our security only to a bona fide system of control and enforcement with real authority to see that every state lives up to its promises.

In the Disarmament Commission, the Soviet representative has resorted to an unceasing barrage of vilification of our motives, deliberate misinterpretation of the tripartite proposals, and attempts to divert the Disarmament Commission's attention by the repetition of monstrous falsehoods about the alleged use of bacteriological weapons by the United Nations in Korea. Apparently the Soviet Union prefers to use the disarmament discussions as a propaganda platform rather than engage in a bona fide mutual negotiation on concrete ways in which to achieve it.

Nevertheless, we intend to press forward in the Commission in the hope that the time will come when the Soviet Union will decide that it really wants to consider the substance of these problems. The proposals which we make are concrete and sincere. They are the result of wide examination and mature consideration within the U.S. Government and the other sponsoring governments. Our proposals are business propositions. They are not mere propaganda. We are prepared to live with them.

We want to reach effective agreements on disarmament. We deeply hope we can reach these agreements. Until we do, however, we must continue to seek security in the other way which President Truman described: By making ourselves so strong that a would-be aggressor would not dare attack.

Technical Assistance To Raise Living Standards

The disarmament program is intended to free men from the threat and destruction of war. Its counterpart, the technical assistance program (more popularly known as the Point Four Program), is designed to give man the food and health and knowledge with which he can enjoy this freedom. This is to be done by carrying to the underdeveloped areas of the world the technical and industrial know-how of our industrial age. The aim is to raise the barometer of peace by lifting the level of man's life.

I will not attempt a technical review of the program. I will only give you a glimpse of its potentialities through specific examples of what it is doing.

The technical assistance program of the United Nations and the specialized agencies is now operating in about 70 countries and is providing assistance in many fields. Of the 742 experts now actually at work in these countries (with some four to five hundred having finished their tasks), a very large number are from engineering or allied fields. They are sanitary, electronic, hydraulic, or aeronautical engineers, specialists in land reclamation and irrigation, in industrial methods and processes, et cetera.

Since the U.N. agencies have no operating responsibility for the various development projects under way in these countries, the work of these experts takes the form of teaching or training, of advising or demonstrating. This is not, in other words, a program of capital investment nor of contracting for the actual construction or management of these various development projects.

But, as a result of the work of these experts, a number of governments are already beginning to provide increased capital for projects whose feasibility has now been established.

Let us take Pakistan as an example. Here the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has made available an American refrigeration engineer to assist in planning a modern meat-packing plant. Having helped in drawing up the plans, he is now in this country getting bids for the necessary equipment. Pakistan is supplying the capital, the FAO's contribution being limited to the cost of the expert's salary and maintenance. In Pakistan, the FAO has also made available two experts in harbor development from the Netherlands to assist in planning modern fish-processing facilities in the port of Karachi, with modern warehouses and iceplants. Also in Pakistan another Netherlands engineer assigned by the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration is drawing up a multipurpose scheme to improve the country's inland water-transport system. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the U.N. agency concerned with promoting international cooperation in science and education, has provided engineers, one from Switzerland and one from New Zealand, to

advise on radio transmission problems as part of a project to develop a modern educational broadcasting service in Pakistan, a land of isolated villages. This work is now being taken over by the International Telecommunication Union.

Or take the case of Ecuador. Here a French hydraulic engineer provided by UNESCO is helping the Government to prepare a program of hydro-electrical and irrigation development and has prepared a plan for the creation of a national institute of electrical engineering. Experts provided jointly by the International Labor Organization and UNESCO are advising the Government concerning the promotion of technical education and scientific research. Sanitary engineers from the United States assisted in the construction of water supply and sewage disposal systems.

An expert on lignite surveyed the deposits in the province of Lanar, and it was determined that lignite could be processed successfully and economically for use as an industrial fuel. A second expert was then sent down to plan the introduction of appropriate mining methods and for the introduction of the necessary up-grading processes.

Programs in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia—a country where economic development and the development of communications and transportation go hand in hand—the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Bank have all been giving assistance to the Government in overcoming its transportation and communication problems. In addition to providing experts to help draw up plans for a road-building program and for rehabilitating and expanding the telecommunications system, the International Bank has loaned the country some 8.5 million dollars for implementing these plans.

The Civil Aviation Organization has been training Ethiopian nationals in all phases of air-transport operations, including both ground forces and fliers. A small civil aviation training school was established, where instruction was given in radio communications, aeroengine maintenance, and meteorology. Since the middle of 1951, 12 mechanics have been trained and are working in the repair shops of Ethiopian airlines; 25 radio mechanics have been trained and are now maintaining and repairing radio equipment of the Addis Ababa airport; 25 meteorological observers

have completed their course and are now staffing a network of weather reporting stations, the first that Ethiopia has ever had. Five Ethiopians have been trained as pilots, have obtained their licenses, and are continuing their advanced studies to form the nucleus of a well-trained corps of pilots.

These are examples of what is going on in many countries which have requested technical assistance from the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

A Formidable Recruiting Task

The problem of recruiting men and women who are technically qualified and also have the flexibility, understanding, and human qualities to do this kind of pioneer work is formidable—and the success of this program depends on those who carry it out. Hundreds of engineers of all kinds will be required in the years ahead—a challenge which the engineering profession will, I am sure, be glad to accept.

So long as the United Nations continues to demonstrate such vitality and vision we need not be discouraged by the alarms of those of little faith crying failure through the land. You whose lives are dedicated to overcoming physical and technical obstacles which, to the layman, seem insuperable well appreciate the value of patience and the indispensable need for persistence, vision, and the courage of one's convictions. But for these qualities, few of the technical feats whose accomplishment is commemorated by this great centennial would have come to pass.

Surely these same qualities are equally required for meeting the great challenges confronting the United Nations. We cannot admit that the political differences which now impede its work are insuperable nor that they should be permitted to paralyze action in fields where action is possible.

The United Nations is but a social and political agency of its members. Like all such agencies it must depend for its motive power upon the devotion and energy of its constituents. This can only come from the persistence, courage, and vision of the people of the member governments of the United Nations. Lacking these, it cannot go forward. If these are forthcoming in full measure, no obstacle will long delay its forward progress. The great body of engineers will, I am confident, in the future as in the past be found in the vanguard of that progress.

Encouraging a New Sense of World Brotherhood

by Isador Lubin

U.S. Representative to U.N. Economic and Social Council¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated September 12

You have asked me to bring you today a message of our responsibility in international affairs. It may be useful if I share with you some of the experience I have gained while representing the United States in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

I would like to say at the outset that our responsibility in world affairs is commensurate with the problems we face. A foreign policy fails if it is unable to cope with the day-to-day tasks that confront it. But it is not enough that we face up to our problems as they present themselves. We must ferret out our problems in their incipient stages. We must define them as well as we can. Then we must take stock of the measures at hand to meet them and go into action.

Helping us to discern and define our many foreign-policy problems, we have, in the United Nations, one of our most useful implements. No longer do we depend for our information solely on the coded telegrams from diplomatic missions or upon reports in the diplomatic pouch supplemented by newspaper dispatches. Voices representing people living in every quarter of the globe now tell their own stories in United Nations forums of their difficulties and their accomplishments, in public, for all to hear.

Many of these voices are strange and new, coming from countries unfamiliar to many of us in America. Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Burma, Libya—these are only a few. Until the United Nations was founded, these countries had little or no opportunity to make themselves heard as independent nations in any world council. Not only are their voices and their accents strange but the things they say we sometimes do not understand. Sometimes they make us angry. We

¹ Address made before the National Conference of Catholic Charities at Cleveland Sept. 14.

are learning to live with people whose histories and whose viewpoints are sometimes very far from our own.

The speeches I have heard around the Council table and in the General Assembly, coming from representatives of underdeveloped countries, tell a consistent story of hardship and suffering throughout a vast area of the world—Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America. We do not have to take their word for their plight. The United Nations has gone out to get the facts. The facts give cause for dismay—and for prompt and concerted action.

Recently the United Nations completed a thorough survey of world social conditions.² It is one of the important documents of our times and I commend it to you if you have not already read it. Let me review for a moment some of the facts it revealed.

The population of the world has now grown to some 2,400 million persons. It is growing at a rate that exceeds 1 percent per year. The new population amounts annually to from 26 million to 32 million. This is about equal to the population of Spain. It is considered likely that the peak of acceleration which has been going on for 2 decades now has been reached. But, even at the present rate of growth, the population problems are immense.

Problems Confronting Underdeveloped Countries

Associated with this population problem is one that is equally dangerous—that is, the wide disparity in the conditions of life among these nearly 2½ billion persons. Half the population of the

² The Secretary-General's Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation (U.N. doc. E/CN.5/267). For a summary statement on the report by Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, see BULLETIN of July 28, 1952, p. 142.

world lives in Asia but they receive only 11 percent of the world income. In North America, which contains about 10 percent of the population, the people earn nearly 45 percent of the world's income. Africa has 8 percent of the population and 3 percent of the income; the remainder of the world—Europe, the Soviet Union, and Oceania—has 25 percent of the population and 40 percent of the income. And the tragic fact is that these disparities are widening rather than narrowing.

Sixty percent of the world's population depends on agriculture for a livelihood, but in underdeveloped countries the percentage ranges up to 80 percent. In many instances these farmers are crowded to the point where the so-called rural population is packed into what virtually constitutes an endless village. In Japan, despite the enlightened land-reform program initiated there under the American occupation, an average of 698 persons live on every square kilometer of cultivated land. In Egypt, 500 persons live on each square kilometer in the Nile Valley. On the island of Java in Indonesia, there is a density of 360 persons. The comparable figure for the United States is 21 persons.

The first and most important problem which confronts these people is the life-and-death matter of food. And, to compound this problem, there is the fact that restoration of destruction both in Europe and Asia, caused by World War II, still has not been fully completed. This damage was not only to the land. Livestock and machinery were destroyed and carried off, buildings burned, storage capacity destroyed, processing plants ripped up, and the skills of the people diverted. In Asia, production of rice, which constitutes 70 percent of the food in that area, still is 2½ percent below prewar levels. In contrast, the population is up 10 percent. Europe, with the aid of the Marshall Plan and, more recently, of mutual security funds, has shown the best comeback. Still, despite increased output in the United States and Canada, food production per person the world over is today less than it was before the war.

So, we have three items on the negative side of the balance, namely: enormously increasing populations; dangerous diversities among conditions of life; and, despite all the improvements that have been brought to bear, dangerous underproduction of food.

Hand in hand with these goes a more positive item, namely, world-wide improvement in health. Modern methods of medicine and the treatment of disease have contributed to a lowering of death rates, which in some instances—Puerto Rico, for example—have dropped as much as 50 percent in a relatively few years. The discovery of DDT and similar chemicals has made it possible to eliminate malaria from Italy, Brazil, and Ceylon. These are actual accomplishments. Yet, 300 mil-

lion persons still continue to suffer from malaria, and, of these, 3 million die annually. The discovery of penicillin has enabled attacks on other mass diseases. Yaws, which once was rampant over most of the land area between the two tropics, now can be stamped out at a modest cost per person.

Developments such as these have the effect of increasing total population. But—and this is the hopeful side—these developments can at the same time be a factor in increasing the food supply. A farmer free of malaria is better able physically to tend his crops.

I have mentioned merely the principal aspects of the broad panorama of how the world lives. I have not mentioned the very severe shortage of housing—a shortage which contributes to such basic ills of society as disease, delinquency, and other maladjustments. It is estimated that the world housing deficiency amounts to 180 million dwelling units.

Nor have I mentioned the millions of refugees who have fled or been driven from their homes—by the Nazis, before and during the war, and later by the Soviets and their satellites.

Now, I am an economist by profession, but I know only too well that some of the most important facts in the world cannot be measured by figures and facts. The conditions I have just outlined are only half the story. The other half—the more important half—is the fact that a revolution of epochal proportions is taking place in the minds of the people most affected by abysmal conditions. Let me read a brief passage from this same U.N. social report:

To an extent which might have seemed inconceivable even fifty years ago, there has come increasing recognition that 2,400 million people have somehow to contrive to live together, and share together the resources of the earth; that the general impoverishment of any area is a matter of concern to all areas; and that the technical experience and knowledge acquired in rapidly changing industrialized societies have somehow to be made available to those communities that are less advanced and less well-equipped.

The report quoted from a distinguished historian to the effect that, in the broad sweep, the twentieth century will be chiefly remembered in future centuries not as an age of political conflicts or technical inventions but as an age in which human society dared to think of the welfare of the whole human race as a practical objective.

This objective of over-all human welfare is not only a practical objective. It is also a vitally necessary one. As the report continues:

Simultaneous with the growth of an international ethic of mutual aid, there has spread among impoverished peoples of the world an awareness—heightened by modern communications and movements of men—that higher standards of living not only exist for others but are possible for themselves. Fatalistic resignation to poverty and disease is giving way to the demand for a better life. The demand is groping and uncertain in direction, charged with conflicting emotions regarding the old and the new, but it is nonetheless a force that is establishing an irreversible trend in history.

And there we have the nub of our problem. People no longer accept hunger, disease, and misery with fatalism or despair. They demand that their conditions be improved.

Where women cook on stones and clean their dishes with ashes, as in parts of the Caribbean; where nearly half the children die before they are 15 and the average person dies before he is 30, as in some sections of India—under such circumstances life is bitter and hostile, full of frustration and despair. But today, modern means of communication penetrate the most remote communities. Those who cannot read and write—and that means nearly half the world—can listen to the loudspeaker set up in the village square. Their thoughts are stirring and they seek answers to their pressing needs.

Where Communism Makes Its Greatest Gains

The mere statement of the conditions under which a billion people are living today is a statement of a problem that clearly affects the American people and their future security. This problem is: life under such conditions breeds a psychological climate in which communism makes its greatest gains.

To the struggling peasant, the Communists cry, "Land for the landless!" The farmer, oppressed by burdensome taxes and exorbitant rents, sees hope in this promise. His limited experience does not enable him to realize that the Communist system of land distribution leads not to individual ownership, in which those who till the soil reap the benefits of the harvest, but rather to a collective system which exploits the individual to enlarge the power of a cruel and dictatorial state.

To the masses, the Communists cry, "Death to the bloody imperialists. Down with the greedy capitalists!" The impoverished wage earner listens often with a heart full of resentment, for the capitalism he knows is a feudal and repressive landlord, and the overseas record of the capitalism of free and enlightened countries, we must unfortunately admit, has not always been without its unsavory chapters. But what the unwary listener does not know is that communism itself is the most vicious imperialism yet conceived by man and that a so-called "liberation" by a Soviet-type government leads not to freedom but to the forced-labor camp.

But even if the threat of communism should by magic fade away, there is no assurance that the festering sores of poverty and ignorance would not spread into another totalitarian disease fully as virulent and destructive as communism. In a state of suffering, aggravated by the belief that a scientifically advanced world cannot end that suffering, peoples may well turn to false leaders and to other vengeful ideologies, still unformulated, holding dire consequences for all mankind.

These, then, are the facts and factors involved

in one of the most baffling problems of foreign policy facing the American people. The first is widespread, deplorable standards of living—so low as to be incomprehensible to the American mind, for few of us have ever experienced anything like it. The second is afflicted people stirring in a new-found hope that the developments of science and a new sense of world brotherhood will aid them in emerging from their dark way of life. The third is hundreds of millions of people attracted by communism's glittering propaganda of false promises.

What is the answer to these problems that are basic to the formulation of American foreign policy? It is futile to expect a sudden end to the conditions that now prevail. Development is a matter of growth over an extended period of time. Even if the world had the financial and technical resources to flood Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America with outside assistance, minimum modern standards could be achieved only within decades and generations. Education, skills, technology do not spring up overnight. Resources are not developed in a few weeks' time.

Nor can we compete with Communist promises by offering more promises than they do. Unrestrained by truth or by any moral code, the Communists can out-promise the Western world until the devil himself won't have it. We can answer, we can explain, we can argue, we can educate—and we do, because we must. But words alone are not enough. Many of the people of the underdeveloped regions feel themselves caught between two great barrages of propaganda. Many do not know which to believe, which way to turn. They are neutral, and neutralism in the struggle for men's understanding is one of our most stubborn problems of foreign policy.

There is an old piece of advice, customarily meted out to young ladies, that the way to a man's heart is through his stomach. As a representative of the male species of human beings, I feel that I possess some qualifications for expressing the opinion that, while this adage is not completely accurate, it is good advice. The stomach route is an excellent route, though not the only one, to a man's affections.

Encouraging Individual Initiative

By the same token, one of the best routes to the minds of the people of the underdeveloped countries is through their own well-being. It takes no literacy at all for a farmer to understand that once his malaria is cured he can make his fields produce more bread. It takes only the most elementary understanding to comprehend that improved seeds grow better crops, or that a safe water supply makes for a healthy community. A mother knows without expert advice why her children die and rejoices when modern medicine diminishes the death rate.

These are techniques which people can master by themselves. The greatest resource of the less developed areas of the world is their human resource. As sick bodies are made well, as adult education finds new skills and talents among the illiterate, as hunger is dissipated, and the mind is applied with ingenuity to their local problems, the people themselves take over their development in their own ways. We don't expect miracles. We can expect progress.

One of the best illustrations I know is a program undertaken by the Indonesian Government with the assistance of the World Health Organization. With a few shots of penicillin costing about two dollars a person, 300,000 people in a selected area were cured of yaws, a painful and debilitating tropical skin disease. In the villages where this occurred, the transformation was startling as compared with yaws-infested communities. Their houses and children are clean, their livestock and crops are well cared for. Farmers' clubs and rural extension courses have new popularity. In one section, a 60-mile canal is being dug with volunteer labor to bring water for wet rice production. They are using only picks, shovels, and baskets, and a powerful new asset—their new zest for life.

This is *practical* experience in the advantages of *freedom*. The Indonesians in this instance found out for themselves what they could do by their own efforts. We call it individual initiative, the heart of our free-enterprise system. In this case it was transplanted to a distant part of the world. Those seeds, if nourished, will grow.

This is the *practical* experience that best combats neutralism and communism. Progress replaces stagnation. Hope drives out despair and the outlook of entire peoples is transformed. The free system can be sold more readily than the Communist system because it is practical. But it won't sell itself to people who have not had experience with its usefulness. They must see with their own eyes how freedom works for their benefit.

This, I want to add, is the policy of your Government for meeting the problems I have described. It is carried out on a world-wide basis under the programs of technical assistance operated under the Point Four Program and, in collaboration with other contributing countries, under a special United Nations program. It is one of the most effective tools of international diplomacy ever discovered. We must apply it with greater vigor.

One of its best features is that by arousing the maximum participation of local resources, it diminishes the need for financial assistance from outside sources. It likewise contributes to the kind of economic and political stability favorable to private investment.

This is not to say, however, that it eliminates the need for intergovernment assistance. Economic development requires electric power, port facilities,

railroads, and irrigation developments. These and other projects pay a return on investment over the years, but they sometimes require capital assistance to get started. The International Bank is doing this type of lending.

Development also calls for schoolhouses and roads, and sewers, which do not ever pay a direct return in dollars. The United States, under the Mutual Security Act, is providing grants for worthwhile projects of this kind.

These are only our economic tools. There are many others. Our task is so huge, and the danger from unfriendly ideologies so great, that no implement should be left unused.

Some General Practitioners in Social and Economic Welfare

I was fascinated recently when I read in one of your Catholic publications a story related by Bishop Raymond A. Lane concerning the work of Catholic priests in South America.

One was Father Gordon N. Fritz, who set out to work among the jungle folk of northern Bolivia who live among the treacherous, green tributaries of the Amazon. "With the help of a dozen ox-carts and a new tractor, the first ever seen in the region, they worked together to haul all their crude rubber out of the jungle at one time," Bishop Lane wrote. "Besides cutting down the work involved, this method produced a larger supply of rubber which commanded a better price than individual quantities would."

Afterward, Father Fritz sent this message to Bishop Lane: "Hauling rubber seems a far cry from baptisms and catechism classes, but it has a direct effect on the lives of the people. No rubber, no clothes. No clothes, no school. And with no school, there is little chance for religion. So to keep religion going, we have to keep the rubber rolling, too."

Another priest, Father Felix J. McGowan, toiling in the same region, put it succinctly by saying: "We don't expect to find our people practicing virtue on an empty stomach."

Nor, may I personally add, do we expect to find people fighting communism on an empty stomach. If we continue to lag—as we are lagging—in the struggle to provide food for a growing world population, we must consider what can be done in good conscience and with moral forthrightness to shape the problem of population growth within manageable proportions. This, too, is part of the total struggle for a free way of life. I need not tell this audience that where communism takes over, religious institutions are the first to be killed off.

The work of missionaries such as Father Fritz and Father McGowan is typical of the jobs that have to be done in literally millions of communities in all parts of the world. They are acting as general practitioners in social and economic

welfare. They have gone into the outlying communities with their sleeves rolled up. They have sought out the crucial problems of the village or the countryside and used their resourcefulness to solve them, to bring about higher standards of living.

Frequently, a single individual who has the knack of making friends with ordinary people can become a catalyst for an entire community. He can demonstrate how, through their own efforts, they can take the clay at their doorstep and build a better house—how they can use the materials and the implements at hand to fashion a better life.

This is foreign policy in shirt sleeves. It is diplomacy that brings one people in friendly contact with another, far away. It is hard work. It will take many hands, including your own. But it is indispensable in the construction of a peace that will benefit generations yet to come as well as our own.

MSA Allotments for U.K., Iceland, and West German Republic

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) announced on September 15 that allotments of 1952-53 defense-support funds totaling \$139,705,000 have been made so far this fiscal year to three European countries.

The allotments provide \$137,318,000 for the United Kingdom, \$1,787,000 for the West German Republic, and \$600,000 for Iceland.

The allotment to the United Kingdom includes \$37,318,000, which is an obligation of the United States to the United Kingdom arising out of operations of the European Payments Union (EPU). This sum, plus \$50,000,000 which was allotted during fiscal year 1951-52, covers MSA's obligation to the United Kingdom through May 31, 1952, under an agreement made when the EPU was formed. Under this agreement, the United States is to reimburse the United Kingdom for losses of gold resulting from the use through June 30, 1952, by other EPU countries of certain pre-EPU sterling holdings.

Allotments are made to permit the participating countries to plan their dollar-import programs and submit specific procurement authorization requests to MSA. The allotments do not necessarily represent either a fixed proportion of total aid for the whole fiscal year or aid for any specified time period within the year.

Discussions and negotiations are currently being conducted with the other Western European countries participating in the Mutual Security Program and initial allotments of funds will be made to them in the near future. Total aid figures for

the year, however, will not be determined until later in the fiscal year.

In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, the annual aid figures will not be finalized until the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO have completed reviews of the military goals, defense programs, and economic capabilities of member countries. Both reviews are expected to be completed prior to the December 15 meeting at Paris of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), at which the Ministers of the NATO countries including U.S. Cabinet officers will agree upon defense build-up goals for each country and recommend methods for achieving them. On the basis of the action agreed upon at the NAC meeting and the findings of the two annual reviews, MSA will finally fix the level of defense support for each country for fiscal year 1953. The aid will be directly related to each country's military goals under the NATO defense plan.

The allotments announced today are the first to be made from MSA's \$1.282 billion defense-support appropriation for this fiscal year. Besides the NATO countries, defense support will be given also to Yugoslavia, a non-NATO country which is opposing Communist aggression. MSA funds also will provide economic aid to Austria, still jointly occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union.

Tax Convention With Switzerland

Press release 742 dated September 19

According to information received from the American Legation at Bern, the American Minister to Switzerland, Richard C. Patterson, Jr., and the Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department, Max Petitpierre, on September 17, 1952, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the convention between the United States and Switzerland for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances, signed at Washington on July 9, 1951. The convention thereupon entered into force and will be applicable to estates or inheritances in the cases of persons who die on or after September 17, 1952. As applied to the taxes imposed in the United States, the convention deals solely with the Federal estate taxes and does not affect the estate or inheritance taxes imposed by the several states, territories, or possessions of the United States or the District of Columbia.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the convention on July 4, 1952, and the President ratified it on July 21, 1952. A proclamation with respect to the entry into force of the convention will be issued by the President.

President Proclaims Venezuelan Trade Agreement

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended and extended (ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943; ch. 118, 57 Stat. 125; ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410; ch. 585, 63 Stat. 697; Public Law 50, 82d Congress), on August 28, 1952 I entered into a supplementary trade agreement, through my duly empowered Plenipotentiary, with the Junta of Government of the United States of Venezuela, through its duly empowered Plenipotentiary, the said supplementary agreement to become effective on and after the thirtieth day following the exchange of my proclamation and the instrument of ratification of the Government of the United States of Venezuela, as provided for in Article 13 of the said supplementary agreement;


AND WHEREAS I proclaimed the said supplementary agreement on September 10, 1952 and my proclamation and the instrument of ratification of the Government of the United States of Venezuela were duly exchanged at the city of Washington on September 11, 1952;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, supplementing my said proclamation of September 10, 1952, do hereby make known and proclaim that the said supplementary agreement, signed on August 28, 1952, will come into force on October 11, 1952.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this nineteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred seventy-seventh.

[SEAL]



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State

SUPPLEMENTARY TRADE AGREEMENT WITH VENEZUELA

The President of the United States of America and the Junta of Government of the United States of Venezuela, guided by the same objectives which motivated the two Governments to conclude the reciprocal trade agreement of November 6, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the original trade agreement) with related notes of the same date, namely, to strengthen the traditional bonds of friendship between the two countries, to maintain the principle of equality of treatment in their commercial

¹ No. 2989, *Fed. Reg.* 8469; for terms of effective date see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 454.

relations, and to promote such relations by granting reciprocal concessions and advantages, have agreed to modify the said agreement in order to adapt it to present circumstances and conditions and in order that it will better correspond to those objectives and for that purpose have designated as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

His Excellency Fletcher Warren, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Venezuela;

The Junta of Government of the United States of Venezuela:

His Excellency Doctor Luis E. Gomez Ruiz, Minister of Foreign Relations of the United States of Venezuela; Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ARTICLE 1

Schedule I of the original trade agreement is replaced by Schedule I of this supplementary agreement annexed hereto and made a part hereof.²

ARTICLE 2

Schedule II of the original trade agreement is amended by inserting therein, in their proper numerical order, the items contained in Schedule II-A of this supplementary agreement annexed hereto and made a part hereof, and by substituting for item 1733 and item 3422 of said Schedule II the item 1733 and the items 3422 set forth in Schedule II-B of this supplementary agreement annexed hereto and made a part hereof.²

ARTICLE 3

The following new Article II-bis is added to the original trade agreement following Article II thereof:

"Article II-Bis

"In each case in which Articles I and II of the original trade agreement refer to the day of the signature of that agreement, the applicable date in respect of all articles added to Schedules I and II of that agreement is the date of this supplementary agreement."

ARTICLE 4

The following new Article V-bis is added to the original trade agreement following Article V thereof:

"Article V-Bis

"Any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States of America enumerated and described in

² Schedules I, II-A, and II-B are not printed here. Texts of these annexes are included in an analysis of the reciprocal concessions and general provisions of the agreement, prepared by the Department of State; a copy of the analysis may be obtained by writing the Division of Commercial Policy, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. For a statement by the President concerning concessions relating to petroleum products, see BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 401.

Schedule I imported into the United States of Venezuela, and any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States of Venezuela enumerated and described in Schedule II imported into the United States of America, shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to the like article of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale."

ARTICLE 5

Article VI of the original trade agreement is amended to read as follows:

"1. No prohibition, restriction or any other form of quantitative regulation shall be imposed by the Government of the United States of Venezuela on the importation of any article, the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States of America enumerated and described in Schedule I, or by the Government of the United States of America on the importation of any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States of Venezuela enumerated and described in Schedule II.

"2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not prevent the Government of the United States of America or the Government of the United States of Venezuela from imposing quantitative regulations in whatever form on the importation or sale of any agricultural or fisheries article, imported in any form, if necessary to secure the effective operation of governmental measures or measures under governmental authority operating to regulate or control the production, market supply, quality or prices of like domestic articles. Whenever the Government of either country proposes to impose or to make more restrictive any quantitative regulation authorized by this paragraph, it shall give notice thereof in writing to the other Government and shall afford such other Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action; and if agreement with respect thereto is not reached the Government which proposes to take such action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and the other Government shall be free within ninety days after such action is taken to terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days' written notice."

ARTICLE 6

The first paragraph of Article IX of the original trade agreement is amended to read as follows:

"In the event that the Government of the United States of America or the Government of the United States of Venezuela establishes or maintains, directly or indirectly, any form of control of the means of international payment, it shall, in the administration of such control:

"(a) Impose no restrictions or delays on the transfer of payment for any imported article the growth, produce or manufacture of the other country, or on the transfer of payments necessary for or incidental to the importation of such article, greater or more onerous than those imposed on the transfer of payment for the importation of the like article from any third country.

"(b) Accord unconditionally, with respect to rates of exchange and taxes or surcharges on exchange transactions in connection with payments for or payments necessary and incidental to the importation of any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the other country, and with respect to all rules and formalities relative thereto, treatment no less favorable than that accorded in connection with the importation of the like article the growth, produce or manufacture of any third country."

ARTICLE 7

Article XIII of the original trade agreement is amended to read as follows:

"1. The Government of each of the Contracting Parties recognizes the desirability of limiting fees and charges, other than duties, imposed by governmental authorities on or in connection with importation or exportation, to the approximate cost of services rendered. Each Government also recognizes the desirability of reducing the number and diversity of such fees and charges, of minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities, and of decreasing and simplifying import and export documentations requirements.

"2. Both Governments recognize the desirability of not imposing substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements. Each Government shall accord the most favorable treatment permitted by law in regard to penalties applicable in the case of errors in the documentation for importation of articles the growth, produce or manufacture of the other country, when the nature of the infraction leaves no doubt with respect to good faith or when the errors are evidently clerical in origin.

"3. The Government of each of the Contracting Parties shall accord sympathetic consideration to the representations which the Government of the other country may make with respect to the operation of customs regulations and quantitative restrictions on imports, the observance of customs formalities and the application of sanitary laws and regulations for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. If there should be disagreement with respect to the application of said sanitary laws and regulations there shall be established, upon the request of either of the Contracting Parties, a committee of experts on which both Governments shall be represented. The committee, after considering the matter, shall submit its report to both Governments."

ARTICLE 8

The following new Article XIII-bis is added to the original trade agreement following Article XIII thereof:

"Article XIII-Bis

"1. If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by the Government of the United States of America or of the United States of Venezuela under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of either country in such relatively increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry in that territory producing like or directly competitive products, the Government of the United States of America or of the United States of Venezuela shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.

"2. Before the Government of the United States of America or of the United States of Venezuela shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 above, it shall give notice in writing to the other Government as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford such other Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action and with respect to such compensatory modifications of this Agreement as may be deemed appropriate to the extent practicable maintaining the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions in the Agreement. If agreement between the two Governments is not reached as a result of such consultation, the Government which proposes to take the action under paragraph 1 shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and, if such action is taken, the other Government shall be free, not later than ninety days after the action has been taken and on thirty days' written notice, either to suspend the application to the trade of the Government

taking action under paragraph 1 of substantially equivalent obligations or concessions under this Agreement, or, if the action nullifies or seriously impairs a principal objective of this Agreement, to terminate the Agreement. Within 30 days after any such suspension has taken effect, the Government taking action under paragraph 1 shall be free to terminate this Agreement on thirty days' written notice. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, under the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action."

ARTICLE 9

Article XV of the original trade agreement is amended to read as follows:

"1. The provisions of this Agreement do not extend to:
"(a) The advantages now accorded or which may hereafter be accorded by the United States of America or the United States of Venezuela to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or advantages resulting from a customs union or a free-trade area which either the United States of America or the United States of Venezuela may enter so long as such advantages are not extended to any other country;

"(b) The advantages now accorded or which may hereafter be accorded by the United States of America, its territories or possessions or the Panama Canal Zone or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to one another or to the Republic of Cuba or to the Republic of the Philippines, irrespective of any change in the political status of any of the territories or possessions of the United States of America, so long as such advantages are not extended to any other country.

"2. The Government of the United States of Venezuela reserves the right to apply to articles imported into the United States of Venezuela from the Antilles under the sovereignty or authority of the United States of America but not included in the customs territory of that country the special surtax applicable to such articles, according to the existing laws of Venezuela, provided the said articles do not originate in the said Antilles."

ARTICLE 10

The first paragraph of Article XVI of the original trade agreement is amended by changing the period at the end thereof to a semicolon and adding the following:

"(5) relating to public security, or imposed for the protection of the country's essential interests in time of war or other national emergency."

ARTICLE 11

Article XVII of the original trade agreement is amended by adding the following sentence at the end thereof:

"If agreement is not reached with respect to the matter within thirty days after such representations or proposals are received, the Government which made them shall be free, within ninety days after the expiration of the aforesaid period of thirty days, to terminate this agreement in whole or in part on thirty days' written notice."

ARTICLE 12

The provisions of the original trade agreement which are not abrogated or modified by this supplementary agreement shall constitute, together with the provisions of this supplementary agreement, the amended reciprocal trade agreement between the two Governments, which shall remain in force, subject to the provisions of Articles VI, IX, XII, XIII-bis and XVII until six months from the date on which either Government shall have given to the other Government written notice of intention to terminate the amended reciprocal trade agreement.

ARTICLE 13

The present supplementary agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and ratified and published by the Government of the United States of Venezuela, in conformity with the laws of the respective countries. It shall enter into force thirty days after the exchange of the proclamation and the instrument of ratification, which shall take place in the City of Washington as soon as possible.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement and have affixed their seals hereto.

DONE in duplicate in the English and Spanish languages, both authentic, at the City of Caracas this twenty-eighth day of August nineteen hundred and fifty-two.

For the President of the United States of America:

FLETCHER WARREN

For the Junta of Government of the United States of Venezuela:

LUIS E. GÓMEZ RUIZ

Consular Convention With U.K. Enters Into Force

Press release 711 dated September 9

On September 8, 1952, the President issued his proclamation of the consular convention and accompanying protocol of signature between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which, in accordance with article 29 of the convention, entered into force on September 7, 1952, the 30th day after the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

The convention and protocol were signed at Washington on June 6, 1951, by the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on June 13, 1952, and the President ratified the convention and protocol on June 26, 1952. The exchange of the respective instruments of ratification of the United States and the United Kingdom took place at London on August 8, 1952.

The convention is the first comprehensive treaty relating to consular officers concluded between the two countries. The only treaty provisions on this subject between the two countries in force at the time of the convention was signed were those in article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of July 3, 1815, and article III of the convention of March 2, 1899, relating to the tenure and disposition of real and personal property. As is customary in the case of consular conventions negotiated between the United States and other countries, the present convention contains provisions relating to the appointment and districts of consular officers; their legal rights and immunities; the inviolability of consular offices, archives, and correspondence; the financial privileges of

consular officers and employees, including certain tax exemptions and customs privileges; the rights of consular officers in connection with the protection of nationals of their country; notarial acts and other services; the authority of consular officers in connection with transfers of property; and their authority in regard to shipping matters. Provision is also made regarding the rights of each country to acquire real estate for official purposes.

Article IV of the treaty of July 3, 1815, is superseded by the present convention in respect of the territories to which the convention applies. The authority of consular officers in connection with the settlement of estates will, however, be governed by the terms of article III of the convention of March 2, 1899, together with articles 18 and 19 of the 1951 convention.

Turkish Road-Building Program To Be Extended With MSA Grant

A program of modern highway construction and maintenance in Turkey, begun more than 4 years ago as a major factor in the country's economic development, is being extended as an important defense need, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) announced on September 17.

Extension of the road program in Turkey—whose borders include the Mediterranean Sea and the borders of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, as well as the Black Sea Coast—will be made possible by a \$3,155,000 grant just approved by MSA.

The Turkish highway project, one of the first large European projects to be sponsored under the Marshall Plan by the Economic Cooperation Administration, predecessor agency to MSA, has previously received some \$13,060,000 in dollar financing, out of a total over-all cost estimate of \$58,000,000 equivalent.

Most of the new financing—\$2,655,000—will be used to purchase additional needed road-construction and maintenance equipment, including graders, maintainers, crushers, a screening plant, dump trucks, bridge-foundation testing devices, and other machinery.

The remaining \$500,000 will be available for technical services, largely to pay salaries and dollar expenses of experts from the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. The American highway specialists, of whom there are at present 37 in Turkey, are supervising the Turkish program and training Turkish personnel in the construction and maintenance work.

Fifteen highway-maintenance shops have been set up under the direction of the Bureau of Pub-

lic Roads personnel, and five more will be equipped through the supplementary financing.

The roads project in Turkey began in December 1947, and received Marshall Plan financing from April 1949 to the present. More than 3,500 miles of roads, many of them previously wagon tracks usable only in the dry seasons, have been built into two-lane, all-weather highways.

\$15 Million Loan to Pakistan for Purchase of U.S. Wheat

White House press release dated September 17

On September 17 His Excellency Mohammed Ali, Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, and Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, participated with the President in a White House ceremony covering the signing and exchange of loan documents providing for a loan of 15 million dollars to Pakistan for the purchase of wheat.

Pakistan, which in good years has sufficient wheat for its own needs and some for export, must this year import large quantities of wheat from abroad. The Pakistani Government has used its available financial resources to purchase wheat wherever it was most readily found. However, the extent of Pakistan's wheat shortage and the limitations of its financial position are such that the Government of the United States has decided that prompt measures should be taken to meet the request of the Government of Pakistan for assistance for the purchase of American wheat.

The loan to the Pakistani Government is being made by the Export-Import Bank, using funds made available under the authority provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. The loan is to run for 35 years with interest at 2½ percent per annum, interest payments to begin after 4 years and repayment of principal to begin after 6 years. The American wheat thus provided is to be distributed through Pakistan's rationing system to supplement the quantities procured locally and the imports already arranged by the Pakistani Government. The Government of Pakistan is defraying distribution and ocean transport costs.

Western Pakistan, the bread basket of the country, suffered a severe drought in the winter of 1951-52. This section is usually a surplus wheat-producing area but this year has become a deficit area. Last year's small crop prevented the Government from procuring locally enough grain to supply the rationing system in the most densely populated urban districts.

U.S. Postwar Aid to Germany From V-E Day to June 30, 1951

(millions of dollars)

	1945-46	1946-47	1947-48	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51	Cumulative
GROSS AID							
PRE-GARIOA	^a 276.3	0	0	0	0	0	276.3
GARIOA	0	243.2	551.8	550.4	189.1	0	1,534.5
ECA:							
Allotments, exclusive of conditional aid	0	0	0	^b 516.0	^c 335.9	399.1	1,251.0
Conditional aid ^d	0	0	0	97.4	121.2	0	218.6
Intra-European aid received ^d	0	0	0	108.3	12.0	0	120.3
Swedish Accord	0	17.5	0	0	0	0	17.5
Surplus property:							
OFLC	0	0	66.7	0	0	0	66.7
Eucom sales ^e	0	0	91.6	0	0	0	91.6
Surplus incentive material ^f	0	0	38.1	20.5	0	0	58.6
Total	276.3	260.7	748.2	1,292.6	658.2	399.1	3,635.1
DEDUCTIONS							
Hicog operating budgets	0	0	0	0	21.4	60.7	82.1
Yugoslav flour shipments	0	0	0	0	0	7.9	7.9
Reverse payments (5 percent C/P) ^f	0	0	0	36.0	11.5	20.0	67.5
Conditional aid	0	0	0	97.4	121.2	0	218.6
Total	0	0	0	133.4	154.1	88.6	376.1
NET AID	276.3	260.7	748.2	1,159.2	504.1	310.5	3,259.0

^a Includes deliveries which extended through December 31, 1949.

^b Covers 15-month period April 3, 1948 through June 30, 1949.

^c Including GARIOA administered by ECA.

^d Allotment basis.

^e Bulk sales.

^f Based upon allotted aid.

These figures show the cost of postwar U.S. aid to Germany through June 30, 1951, and were used as a basis for negotiating the settlement of U.S. postwar claims with the Federal Republic of Germany. These figures differ somewhat from those appearing in *Foreign Aid by the United States Government*, published by the Department of Commerce, since ECA aid is here shown on an allotment rather than a paid-shipments basis, and Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) aid is shown on the basis of expenditures charged by fiscal year of GARIOA appropriations rather than on the basis of current value at time of shipment.

The statement of the amount of the debt presented to the Germans excludes such items as UNRRA funds, which were used primarily for refugees, and post-UNRRA funds, which subsidized freight parcels sent through the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid. The reverse payment of the 5 percent counterpart is the only deduction appearing in *Foreign Aid by the United States Government*.

Aid extended to Germany by other countries which in turn received compensating shipments from the United States under inter-European aid arrangements is not debited to Germany in the Department of Commerce publication. That publication also excludes the Swedish Accord and European Command (Eucom) sale, although the latter is scheduled for inclusion.

Inter-American Action To Preserve Forests

FOURTH SESSION OF THE FAO LATIN AMERICAN FORESTRY COMMISSION, BUENOS AIRES, JUNE 16-23, 1952

by Frank H. Wadsworth

The Latin American Forestry Commission of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is an international body of technicians advisory to the FAO and serviced by the Latin American Office for Forestry and Forest Products, located at Rio de Janeiro. The Commission, set up in 1949, held three sessions prior to this year, at Rio de Janeiro, Lima, and Santiago, Chile. At Santiago it was decided to hold sessions every second year, between the years of the general FAO conferences, with the result that the fourth session was scheduled for 1952.

The fourth session was called primarily to consider and offer advice concerning (1) the progress of the FAO regional forestry program, (2) the significance of the sixth FAO Conference in 1951 to forestry in Latin America, and (3) plans and prospects for an FAO forestry program in the future. Specific subjects covered under these headings follow:

1. FAO progress since the third session
 - a. Resolutions from the third session
 - b. The expanded technical assistance program
 - c. The pulp and paper study
2. The significance of the sixth FAO Conference in 1951
3. Plans and prospects for the future
 - a. The Latin American Institute for Forestry Training and Research
 - b. Forestry training centers
 - c. Forest policy reports
 - d. The proposed International Congress on Tropical Forestry
 - e. The proposed eucalyptus study tour to Australia
 - f. Coordination of Arbor Day activities

At the invitation of Argentina, the fourth session was held at Buenos Aires. Invitations were

sent to all governments within Latin America, to outside governments with possessions within the Latin American region, and to interested international agencies. Delegations were sent by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, Mexico, Paraguay, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Colombia, Honduras, and the Netherlands assigned diplomatic representatives in Buenos Aires as their delegates. In addition, observers represented the Vatican, the Caribbean Commission, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, the central and regional offices of FAO, the International Labor Office, and the Organization of American States.

The U.S. delegation included, as delegate, Frank H. Wadsworth of the Forest Service, Puerto Rico, and, as advisers, Clarence A. Boonstra, agricultural attaché, Argentina, and Edward B. Hamill of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Paraguay.

The accomplishments of the session, in the form of opinions expressed and formal resolutions approved, are described in accordance with the agenda already outlined.

FAO Progress Since the Third Session

A number of the resolutions of the third session called for specific action by FAO or the Latin American governments. Some progress has been made on these. Technical assistance has expanded. Facilities for research have been surveyed, although no regional program has begun. Chemical utilization is being studied in cooperation with the Economic Commission for Latin America. On the other hand, no notable progress has been made on the recommendations to standardize forest terminology and word nomenclature.

The technical-assistance program of FAO has

expanded materially in the past 2 years. Forestry missions including about 20 specialists are now active in Mexico, Honduras, Haiti, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay. Some of these missions, such as those in Mexico and Chile, are large and contain a balanced group of specialists for a broad study program. Others, such as those in Haiti and Brazil, consist of but one specialist who is working in a narrow field yet is laying a foundation for a broader future program. A short-term mission to Uruguay has already been completed.

The Commission, after hearing the reports of the directors of all active missions, commended FAO for good progress in this field. Special reference was made to the technical competence and the understanding of the mission specialists. It was recommended, however, that FAO make full use of available Latin American technicians qualified as specialists for such missions. To this end, Latin American governments were requested to send lists of technicians to FAO with descriptions of qualifications.

The Latin American FAO office was requested to study the techniques of technical-assistance programs outside of this region to assure that every desirable type of assistance is available to Latin America.

Without exception, representatives from countries with missions expressed enthusiasm about the program. It was recommended that governments, in order to get the most from the missions, make available such local technical help as is needed. This might well include young men who could receive valuable training as a result of their participation.

Consideration of the character of requests for technical assistance and of the scope of missions now active showed that some of these concern problems which transcend international boundaries. It was recommended that for most efficient use of mission specialists, FAO consider organizing such missions on a regional rather than a national basis.

A session concerning the pulp and paper study under way throughout Latin America jointly by FAO and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) proved to be of great interest and was exceptionally well attended by the general public. As an introduction, FAO pointed out that merely for self-sufficiency in pulp and pulp products (excluding any rise in per capita consumption) a minimum of 22 mills of 30,000-ton annual capacity must be constructed in Latin America. Needs in 1960 are estimated at twice that figure. The field party, including specialists from Mexico and Brazil, has surveyed several countries, but the final reports will not be available for several months. The study is considering the broader aspects of this problem, including nonwood fiber sources, and is going into some detail as to approximate quantities available and prospective mill sites.

In recognition of the importance of the FAO-ECLA pulp and paper study, the Commission urged local governments to lend all possible assistance. FAO was asked to eventually broaden this study to include production techniques, i.e., silviculture, regeneration, and management in pulpwood regions.

Four recommendations of the sixth FAO Conference, held at Rome in 1951, were considered to carry a special significance for forestry and apply to Latin America as well as to the rest of the world. These recommendations, entitled "Objectives and programs for agricultural development," "Farming practices," "Agrarian reform," and "Investments for agricultural development" are believed to deserve special attention by Latin American governments, which were invited to prepare 5-year plans for forest production for submission to FAO.

Plans and Prospects for the Future

FAO for 3 years has made an effort to establish a Latin American Institute for Forestry Training and Research. As conceived, the institute would consist of a center for professional forestry training and for such research as could be centralized. The institute would also embrace a number of co-ordinated regional forest experiment stations investigating local problems.

In past sessions the Commission has received proposals for some of the regional experiment stations but none for the center itself, so that establishment of the institute has been precluded.

At the fourth session this agenda item was one of the most important because the Government of Venezuela had formally offered the National University of the Andes, at Merida, as a seat for this center. This offer, which included the use of existing facilities and material cooperation from the newly formed forestry school of the university, was accepted unanimously by the Commission. This action represents an outstanding concerted regional effort to solve regional problems on a regional basis, and as such it may well be the most important accomplishment of the fourth session.

The Commission recognized the importance of designating the regional forest experiment stations promptly, and suggested as a preliminary basis for such selection six large regions: Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean, the tropical Andes, the southern Andes, the Paraná-Plata-Paraguay region, and Amazonia. Considering existing forest research stations and facilities throughout Latin America and past offers to FAO for such stations, the following were recommended for these regions, respectively: Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, in Costa Rica; the Tropical Forest Experiment Station, in Puerto Rico; Tingo María Station, in Peru; the University of Concepción, in Chile; and two as yet unnamed localities in Argentina and Brazil.

To implement the proposed regional research

program, the Commission set up a subcommission of representatives of directly interested governments and agencies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Venezuela, and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. This subcommission is to meet as soon as formal offers are received from Argentina and Brazil and has the responsibility of drawing up coordinated plans of operation for submission to the Latin American governments.

The Commission recognized the need for local subprofessional training in theory and practice of forest administration, organization, and management. This need, which cannot be filled by the Institute, apparently can best be met by regional short courses or temporary training centers, each of which, regardless of political boundaries, would serve the entire geographic region faced with the problems to be treated. Two courses of this nature have already been held in Central America, sponsored jointly by FAO and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.

The Commission recommended that FAO draw up a list of important regional forest problems which might serve as themes for these courses and then gradually embark upon this program, using technical-assistance funds but obtaining maximum help and coordination from other agencies and governments concerned. FAO was requested to make full use of qualified Latin American technicians for leadership in these courses.

The Rio de Janeiro office of FAO had requested prior to the session that each delegation bring a report describing the forest policy of its country as a means to better mutual understanding of problems and programs. It was proposed that such reports might be requested from time to time in the future by FAO and distributed generally for regional benefit. The reports prepared were read before the Commission and discussed by a special subcommission.

The Commission considered these reports to be of considerable importance to the region and requested FAO to summarize and combine them into a single document for general distribution. In addition, study of the content of these reports led the Commission to make certain immediate recommendations for the advancement of forestry throughout Latin America. It was recommended that Latin American governments study their local woods to increase their utility and utilization; that they adopt measures to eliminate waste in utilization of forest products; that, by provision for credit and other means, they encourage such new industries as can be supported permanently by forest resources available and prospective; and that they encourage rational management and utilization of privately owned forests. It was also recommended that FAO encourage the federation of existing local associations of foresters within Latin America.

The sixth FAO Conference suggested that an

International Tropical Forestry Congress, originally proposed 2 years ago, might well be held in conjunction with the World Forestry Congress planned for 1954. The Commission was not in favor of merging the two, since that might obscure tropical subjects within broader themes. However, the Commission considered it desirable that the two Congresses be held at the same place in succession to make possible attendance of both at a minimum of expense.

The Commission considers it essential that the Tropical Congress be held in the tropical zone and, for this reason, asked FAO to give preference to a tropical location for the World Congress. If this is not possible, the Tropical Congress should be held separately at an appropriate location. FAO was asked to consult the various governments concerning the agenda, the nature of the material to be presented, and the type of representation desired when location and date shall have been decided.

Study Tours

FAO, after carrying out a successful forest-fire-control study tour in the United States, has arranged with the Australian Government for a similar tour for study of the habitat, management, and utilization of eucalyptus. FAO has offered to pay half the transportation cost to Australia and all living costs of students while they are there. This subject was included in the agenda to get the reaction of the Commission to these study tours, first in the general sense, and then specifically to this proposed tour.

The Commission considered these study tours a worthy project. It recommended that governments take full advantage of the eucalyptus tour and, to that end, that they initiate studies of local problems related to eucalyptus.

Celebration of Arbor Day was included in the agenda because FAO wanted opinion as to whether celebration on a coordinated international scale might increase the educational value of this activity in countries where it is least effective at present. The delegates pointed out that conditions for tree planting and conservation practices which should be emphasized in the celebration vary so widely throughout the region that synchronization would be difficult at this time. The Commission recommended that FAO collect information regarding the celebration and its effectiveness in the different countries and distribute a statement of experience throughout the region for the benefit of all.

Other matters considered by the Commission included the meeting of the International Union for the Protection of Nature, which was held at Caracas in September of this year. The Commission, in recognition of the interest of foresters in the work of this organization, recommended that governments consider sending foresters as their

representatives. In this same connection, it was recommended that the Organization of American States consider a revision of the Washington Convention for the Protection of Fauna and Flora, now about 12 years old. Such a revision should be submitted to the Pan American Union for its consideration.

Regarding the standardization of forestry terminology, which had been discussed at the third session, the Commission recommended that the Spanish-English glossary of forestry terminology in preparation at the Tropical Forest Experiment Station in Puerto Rico serve as a basis for a Latin American forestry terminology. It also recom-

mended that the Tropical Station submit the as yet incomplete work to FAO for distribution throughout Latin America for comment, amendments, and additions.

Finally, the Commission elected as its chairman for the next 2 years Lucas A. Tortorelli, General Administrator of Forests of Argentina. The date of the fifth session was set for 1954. Venezuela offered Merida as a site, but a final decision is to await future developments.

● *Mr. Wadsworth, author of the above article, is a forester in the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, Tropical Region.*

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD MAY 16-31, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2768
Transmitted September 8, 1952

I herewith submit report number 46 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 May 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1265-1281 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Plenary sessions of the military Armistice Conference met daily with the exception of a three-day recess from 24 May through 26 May. These meetings were characterized by an endless repetition of Communist propaganda themes. In order to illustrate the illogical approach of the Communists to the Prisoner of War problem and to refute the implications of the daily charges by the Communists, the senior United Nations Command Delegate made the following statement on 21 May:

"Your side continues to display crass hypocrisy on the Prisoner of War issue. Have you, for example, undertaken to settle the problem of the more than 50,000 military persons of our side whose capture you reported but whose names you have omitted from the lists of Prisoners of War to be exchanged? Have you undertaken to restore to these 50,000 Prisoners of War the rights ac-

corded them by the Geneva Convention? Have you reported their capture to the Information Bureau at Geneva as required by the Convention of War Prisoners? Have you opened your Prisoner of War camps to visits by neutral benevolent societies as required by the Geneva Convention? Have you agreed to the exchange during hostilities of the seriously sick and injured as required by the Geneva Convention? Have you undertaken to refrain from using captured personnel in a military capacity or in labor directly contributing to military operations as is required by the Geneva Convention, or do you adhere to your announced policy of incorporating captured military personnel into your military forces? Have you undertaken to restore to Prisoner of War status those captured personnel whom you have incorporated into your armed forces or have transported to China or elsewhere? You have not.

"Never before in modern history has a belligerent displayed less regard for the rights and welfare of Prisoners of War. Never before have the rights of Prisoners of War been so fully and completely violated. Never before has a belligerent unilaterally disposed of four-fifths of the captured personnel of the other side before sitting down at the conference table."

Since presenting its proposal of 28 April² for solution of the remaining problems, the United Nations Command Delegation has attempted to impress the Communists that this offer is firm, final and irrevocable. Typical of the statements made to this end by the Delegation is the following quotation from the proceedings of 20 May:

"Your side should be fully aware that the United Nations Command cannot and will not accept a solution to the Prisoner of War problem unless that solution provides for and respects fundamental human rights and fully considers the dignity and worth of the human per-

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 8. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, *ibid.*, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, *ibid.*, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; and the 45th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272.

son. The United Nations Command has proposed such a solution. It must be obvious to you that the United Nations Command cannot accept any compromise in its basic and fundamental principles. It must also be obvious to you that the United Nations Command proposal of April 28th, by its very nature, is firm, final, and irrevocable.

"During the Item 4 Staff Officers' meetings, our side entered into in good faith an arrangement to determine the approximate number of Prisoners of War held by our side who would not forcibly resist returning to your side. The procedures used by our side to accomplish this were scrupulously fair. No amount of slander and false allegations by your side can change the truth of this matter. Nevertheless, our side has stated many times our willingness to have the results of our survey examined and verified by an impartial group and witnessed by your side. In order that your side can have no excuse to avoid the witnessing of this procedure, our side has stated its willingness to have it conducted at the exchange point in the demilitarized zone. For your side to refuse this reasonable proposition is to deny the human rights of individuals.

"The counterproposal your side made on May 2nd is one which would compel the United Nations Command to jeopardize the lives of numerous human beings by using force and violence in sending them to your side against their will. The United Nations Command will not accede to such an inhuman proposition. To do so would be to repudiate one of the purposes and principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

"It should be quite clear to you now that the United Nations Command cannot accept your inhuman counterproposal of May 2nd. It should be quite clear to you now that the United Nations Command solution to the Prisoner of War problem proposed on April 28th is the only solution which can be accepted by the United Nations Command. It should be obvious to you that the United Nations Command proposal of 28 April cannot and will not be other than its firm, final, and irrevocable position."

On 23 May, Major General William K. Harrison replaced Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy as the senior United Nations Command Delegate to the Military Armistice Conference. At the meeting of 22 May, Admiral Joy informed the Communist Delegation of this change.

On 28 May, Brigadier General Lee Han Lim replaced Major General J. H. Yu as the United Nations Command Delegate from the Republic of Korea.

Following the release of Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd by fanatical Communists on Koje-do who had held him prisoner for approximately three days, a board of officers was appointed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to ascertain the facts leading up to General Dodd's seizure and to the circumstances surrounding the negotiations which resulted in his release. The report of the investigation together with the recommendations of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, were reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and forwarded with his recommendations, to the Department of the Army.

Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, an outstanding combat officer with extensive experience in the Far East, was appointed Commanding General of United Nations Command Prisoner of War Camp Number One. He immediately put into effect a directive received from the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to take immediate steps to seize uncontested control of the rebellious Communist prisoners at Koje-do. The following statement was issued by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, concurrent with this movement:

"Communist prisoners of war and civilian internees on Koje-do have not only resorted, on repeated occasions, to unlawful violence but, obviously acting under instructions from outside agents of the international Communist power conspiracy, have threatened mass outbreaks which inevitably would result in additional violence and bloodshed. I do not propose to countenance for one moment

further unlawful acts on the part of these prisoners of war and civilian internees.

"The United Nations authorities will continue to observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention in the administration of United Nations Command Prisoner of War Camp Number One and at all other Prisoner of War camps under their control. At the same time, they will require that the prisoners of war and civilian internees observe the responsibilities placed on them by the provisions of the same convention. Good order and discipline will be required of them at all times."

The security forces at the United Nations Command Prisoner of War Camp Number One on Koje-do were reinforced by one company of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, the First Company of the Royal Canadian Regiment, and the First Company of the Greek Expeditionary Forces. The United States 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment had been ordered previously to the island. These units were integrated rapidly into the over-all camp structure. Plans have been formulated for separating the Communist Prisoner of War population into smaller, more easily administered groups.

The United Nations press representatives interested in the Prisoner of War situation were provided additional transportation, over-night accommodations and communications facilities on Koje-do, thus enabling the prompt reporting and maximum coverage for all news media.

On 20 May prompt and firm action by United Nations Command personnel averted what might have been a serious incident at the Prisoner of War hospital compound in Pusan. Fanatical Communist agitators, who had been serving as hospital attendants in this compound, had refused to admit camp medical personnel or to permit ill patients to leave the compound for medical attention. The camp authorities directed the prison attendants to report to the compound gate for transfer to another inclosure in order that patients needing medical attention could be handled without interference. Announcements designed to segregate the agitators from other prisoners went overtly unanswered for half an hour. It was then evident that the terroristic Communist Prisoner of War leaders would resist by violence. Armed United States military personnel moved into the compound where they met stiff opposition from Communist prisoners, led by fanatical leaders, all employing spears, barbed wire flails, rocks, and a variety of other weapons against security troops.

United Nations Command troops used a show of force to overcome the opposition. No shots were fired and only riot control tactics were used. In gaining control of the compound one prisoner was killed and eighty-five others suffered injuries, most of them minor. One member of the United Nations Command forces suffered a minor wound. The situation was well in hand two hours after the action started. The remaining compounds at Pusan are now under complete control of the camp's authorities and no other casualties have resulted from these operations.

In the new camps which have been established at Cheju-do and on the mainland of Korea to accommodate the prisoners of war and civilian internees who indicated their strong opposition to return to Communist control, little difficulty has been encountered. The attitude of these individuals has been generally favorable and cooperative.

Minor clashes continued to typify the ground action along the Korean battle line. Both United Nations Command and enemy units offered determined and effective resistance to the raids and patrol of opposing elements during the period. The most noteworthy enemy-initiated action consisted of an attack by two companies against United Nations Command positions on the western front which was repulsed despite the aggressiveness displayed by the attacking units. Generally, hostile forces limited their activities to widely scattered probing efforts against United Nations Command forward positions during the hours of darkness, and to the interception of United

Nations Command patrols. Enemy forward troop dispositions and front lines remained unchanged.

On the western front, enemy aggressiveness was more pronounced than elsewhere. On 27 May, two enemy companies struck a United Nations Command outpost five miles south-southwest of Mabang. The attack was preceded by a thirty-five minute artillery and mortar preparation of over two thousand rounds and was supported by fire from hostile tanks and self-propelled guns. The hostile force vigorously pressed the attack for four hours but was unable to penetrate the United Nations Command defenses. The enemy attempted other unsuccessful probing attacks of lesser size against United Nations Command positions. Such attacks were particularly numerous in the Sangnyong, Punji and Kigong areas during the latter part of the period. These actions, usually of one hour duration or less, were all repulsed by local United Nations Command elements without loss of ground. United Nations Command patrols along the western front, as elsewhere, met with determined resistance and were generally unable to penetrate the enemy's main battle positions. An exception occurred on 28 May when United Nations Command elements, in a three-pronged raid, forced the withdrawal of hostile units defending three objectives in the Punji area. The defenders engaged in hand-to-hand combat and employed the largest concentration of artillery and mortar fire in recent months in a vain attempt to retain their positions.

Hostile action on the central front remained minor. The largest single enemy action consisted of an attack, employing a company, against United Nations Command positions south of Yulsa. This engagement terminated with the withdrawal of the enemy unit. In numerous instances United Nations Command armored units ranged forward to engage hostile positions and targets of opportunity on the central front. In the largest such operation, United Nations Command tanks fired on hostile troops and installations in the Sutae and Kumsong areas, resulting in the destruction of 103 enemy bunkers and gun positions, and damage to seventy-four others. Hostile reaction to these forays was meager, consisting of a light volume of mortar and artillery fire.

There was no appreciable change in the character of battle action on the eastern front. Forward enemy units maintained a tight and effective defense against the numerous United Nations Command patrols seeking enemy dispositions and activities. The majority of these United Nations Command-initiated patrol clashes were fought in the Talchon-Mulguji areas of the eastern front. Enemy offensive inclination was limited to brief, ineffective probes by units of squad and platoon size. United Nations Command elements on the eastern front continued to receive the bulk of enemy's ineffectual front-line propaganda efforts, including broadcasts and leaflets disseminated by mortar and artillery fire.

During the period the enemy continued to improve his combat capabilities. Indications remained predominantly defensive. Enemy units, both in forward and rear areas, continued to improve their defensive positions. Prisoner of War statements were still indicative of an enemy defensive attitude. In addition, prisoners of war were not cognizant of any preparations for an imminent offensive. Nevertheless, Communist military forces in Korea were steadily improving their offensive capability. The level of hostile vehicle and rail activity, coupled with other indications, clearly reveals the improvement of the enemy's logistical position. Indicated troop movements in the enemy's rear areas also point toward an improved offensive capability. Indications at present fail to disclose the imminence of a hostile attack. However, Communist forces are capable of launching a major offensive with little additional preparation or warning.

United Nations Command fast carriers operating in the Sea of Japan, despite three days of non-operational weather during the period, operated against North Korean transportation facilities and supply routes. Attacks by the jet and propeller driven aircraft were concentrated on the vulnerable rail lines along the Korean east coast

in continuation of the interdiction program. Rail lines were cut and bridges and by-passes, locomotives, and rail cars were destroyed. Additional destruction included military structures, trucks, boats, and numerous supplies, storage facilities and gun positions. No enemy air opposition was encountered.

United Nations Command carriers operated in the Yellow Sea with their planes furnishing cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Sukchon and into the Chinnampo area and the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops and friendly guerrilla raids behind enemy lines. Additional destruction and damage included numerous supplies, bunkers, warehouses, rail cars, trucks, vehicles, and supply routes.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew in support of friendly front line units, destroying bunkers, mortar and gun positions, military buildings, troop shelters, and trucks. Rails were cut and trenches were torn up.

Patrol planes based in Japan and Okinawa conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols, firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and tunnel blocks at several specific points. The siege by surface units continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam and Songjin. Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gunfire on call for the front line troops.

The bombardment along the east coast, reported by spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties and the firing vessels themselves, resulted in the destruction and damage of bunkers, mortar, artillery, and coastal gun positions, boats, rail cars, and trucks. Armed raiding parties, using boats of the blockading vessels continued nightly coastal sweeps. Three sampans and twenty prisoners were captured. In other cases, the motor whale boats searched out enemy targets and furnished spot for the firing ship, materially aiding in the effectiveness of the interdiction of the coastal main supply route.

Enemy shore batteries continued active along the coast, although in many cases only a few rounds were fired. At Songjin two minesweepers received hits. Although shrapnel damage was considerable, there were no personnel casualties and neither vessel suffered a loss of operational efficiency.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast, from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, destroying military buildings and inflicting many casualties. Three guerrilla raids during the period were supported by surface and air units in the Haeju approaches. Many casualties were inflicted and several Chinese Communist Forces prisoners taken. In addition, many guns and mortars were destroyed and damaged and large quantities of enemy equipment and cattle were captured by friendly forces.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

The United Nations minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas as needed by the operating forces.

United States naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lift and logistic support for the United Nations air, ground and naval forces in Japan and Korea.

Fighter interceptor aircraft of the United Nations Command air forces continued their mission of maintaining air superiority over Korea and providing a screening force for fighter bombers cutting rail lines. Certain changes, which may prove to be significant, were noticed in the pattern of enemy air activity. Communist jet aircraft were encountered in smaller formations and at lower altitudes than previously noted and were apparently more willing to engage in combat. United Nations Command fighter bombers highlighted their activity by a massive raid on a Communist supply and manufacturing center southwest of Pyongyang. The fighter bombers continued the systematic cutting of main rail lines, flew regular armed reconnaissance missions and provided close air support to ground units in the almost stationary ground battle against the Communist forces. Light bombers were utilized on night armed reconnaissance missions to attack trains and vehicular convoys attempting to move under the cover of darkness. Medium bombers continued to knock out rail bridges and by-passes on the two main rail lines in northwest Korea to stop movement of enemy supplies from Manchuria.

In the area between Sinuiju and Sinanju and along the Yalu River, fighter interceptors encountered enemy MIG aircraft in formation of only three or four planes. Until recently the enemy fighters were appearing in much larger formations. The total number of enemy jets sighted during the period was slightly lower than reported during the first half of the month. However, the enemy aircraft were engaged in combat on forty occasions.

The heaviest aerial fighting occurred on 25 May when fighter interceptor pilots destroyed four MIGs and damaged one. During the day, ninety-three enemy jet aircraft were sighted and sixty engaged in sixteen separate battles. Ten of the engagements occurred when small groups of Red fighters attacked United Nations Command fighter bombers on rail cutting missions deep in enemy territory.

United Nations Command pilots reported a continued increase in the aggressiveness of enemy pilots; however, the fighter interceptors continued to attack the Communist jets at every opportunity resulting in a total score of eleven MIGs destroyed and five damaged.

Fighter bombers conducted a large scale attack on the Communist supply and manufacturing center near Kiyangni on 22 May. The fighter bombers hit military targets in this area on three consecutive days with capacity loads of bombs, rockets, napalm and .50 caliber ammunition in a closely timed operation which reduced the important storage and manufacturing center to charred rubble.

United Nations Command fighter bombers, after carefully planning attacks on the principal enemy rail lines, claimed extensive rail cuts and damage to road beds. Concentrated bombing in certain mountain pass areas caused landslides which blocked the railroad lines.

United Nations Command aircraft flew in direct support of United Nations ground forces providing an advantage not enjoyed by the Communist troops. These close support sorties and missions included pre-briefed attacks on the enemy's heavy artillery positions. In bomb, rocket and strafing attacks the enemy's gun positions were silenced, bunkers destroyed and casualties inflicted on Communist troops.

Night attacks on enemy truck convoys were conducted by United Nations Command light bombers resulting in the destruction of numerous vehicles trying to move supplies to the enemy's ground forces on the front lines. The light bombers continued to decrease the enemy's rail repair capability by dropping delayed fuse bombs at the points where fighter bombers had made daylight attacks on the rail lines.

Because of the tremendous bridge repair capability of the enemy, the United Nations Command medium bombers continued to concentrate their effort on the bridges along the rail lines between Sinanju and Sinuiju and between Kunuri and Kanggye. On the first line, traffic was blocked by three attacks which destroyed portions of the bridge at Kwaksan and by a single attack on the bridge

at Kogunryongdong. The bombers were not affected by the occasional passes made by enemy night fighters or by the anti-aircraft fire. Missions were scheduled against the Sinhungdong bridge, on the second line, on four occasions and post-strike photography showed the bridge to be out of commission after each attack. Traffic was also stopped on this line by three attacks on bridges near Huichon.

The Third Air Rescue Squadron of the United States Air Force continued to perform its rescue mission in support of the United Nations Command operations in Korea. On 18 May the Third Air Rescue Squadron, in two operations, successfully rescued United Nations Command personnel who had been downed within thirty and sixty-five miles respectively of the Communist air complex of Antung. These operations were effected while flying unarmed aircraft in the face of potentially overwhelming air opposition by the enemy.

In reporting the continued Communist obstruction of an Armistice Agreement, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts have made known the heroic determination of thousands of Communist prisoners to resist forcible repatriation at all costs. The United Nations Command media have shown how the action of these prisoners has for all time disproved the Communists' cynical pretense to speak for the people of Korea and China. Other United Nations Command broadcasts and leaflets have exposed the subservience of the Communist puppet regimes to alien interests inimical to Korea and China. Attention has also been focused on the inherently destructive character of Communism as manifested in Korea by its record of provoking internal strife, inculcating racial and national hatred, and ultimately in launching unprovoked and wanton aggression.

An Agreement on Economic Co-ordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command was signed on 24 May 1952 at Pusan. (A copy of the Agreement is enclosed). The Unified Command Mission was headed by Mr. Clarence E. Meyer, Special Representative of President Truman, and the delegation of the Republic of Korea was headed by Finance Minister Paek Tu-chin.

The agreement provides for the establishment of a Combined Economic Board composed of one representative from the Republic of Korea, and one representative from the United Nations Command. The primary function of the Board is to promote effective economic co-ordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command. Under the agreement, the Unified Command will assist the Republic of Korea Government in ascertaining their requirements for equipment, supplies and services; and within the limits of resources made available will provide food, clothing and shelter for the population as necessary to prevent epidemics, disease and unrest. The Unified Command will also assist the Republic of Korea in rehabilitation projects which will permit early indigenous production of necessities.

The Government of the Republic of Korea on its part has agreed to take further measures to prevent inflation, hoarding and harmful speculative activities; to apply sound, comprehensive, and adequate budgetary, fiscal and monetary policies, including maximum collection of revenue; and to maintain adequate controls over public and private credit. The Republic of Korea Government has also agreed to promote wage and price stability; to make the most effective use of all foreign exchange resources; and to maximize production for export.

In a corollary exchange of notes,² the United States has agreed to (1) pay for all whan drawn by the United Nations Forces and sold to United States personnel at the rate at which the whan was sold and (2) pay for all whan expended by the United States for *bona fide* military purposes during the period 1 January 1952-31 May 1952. The United States has also agreed to make a partial payment to the Korean Government of \$4,000,000 monthly for whan expended by United States Forces for

² Not printed here.

bona fide military purposes during the period 1 June 1952-31 March 1953. In addition, as soon as practicable, after 31 March 1953, the United States has agreed to make full and final settlement for all when used between 1 June 1952 and 31 March 1953 for *bona fide* military purposes not previously settled. The Republic of Korea Government has agreed to utilize the proceeds of the sale of foreign exchange or imports derived from the payments in accordance with principles contained in the agreement. The above settlements are without prejudice to settlement of any other claims arising from the provision and use of currency and credits for periods prior to 1 January 1952 for which settlement has not yet been made.

[Enclosure]

AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC COORDINATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND

24 May 1952

WHEREAS by the aggression of Communist forces the Republic of Korea became in need of assistance from the United Nations;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations by the resolution of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations by the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, recommended that members furnishing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations, by the resolution of the Security Council of 31 July 1950, requested the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

AND WHEREAS it became necessary to carry out collective action against aggression on Korean soil;

AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the 7 July 1950, resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Unified Command has designated the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to exercise command responsibilities in Korea;

AND WHEREAS the Unified Command has already furnished and is furnishing substantial assistance to the Republic of Korea;

AND WHEREAS it is desirable to coordinate economic matters between the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea, in order to insure effective support of the military forces of the United Nations Command, to relieve the hardships of the people of Korea, and to establish and maintain a stable economy in the Republic of Korea; all without infringing upon the sovereign rights of the Republic of Korea;

THEREFORE, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America acting pursuant to the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations of 7 July 1950, and 31 July 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Unified Command) have entered into this agreement in terms as set forth below:

ARTICLE I

Board

1. There shall be established a Combined Economic Board, hereafter referred to as the Board.
2. The Board shall be composed of one representative from the Republic of Korea and one representative of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). Before appointing its representative each

party shall ascertain that such appointment is agreeable to the other party. The Board shall establish such subordinate organization as may be necessary to perform its functions and shall determine its own procedures. It shall meet regularly at an appropriate location in the Republic of Korea.

3. The primary function of the Board shall be to promote effective economic coordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command. The Board shall be the principal means for consultation between the parties on economic matters and shall make appropriate and timely recommendations to the parties concerning the implementation of this Agreement. Such recommendations shall be made only upon mutual agreement of both representatives. The Board shall be a coordinating and advisory body; it shall not be an operating body.

4. The Board and the parties hereto will be guided by the following general principles:

(a) The Board will consider all economic aspects of the Unified Command programs for assistance to the Republic of Korea and all pertinent aspects of the economy and programs of the Republic of Korea, in order that each of the Board's recommendations may be a part of a consistent overall program designed to provide maximum support to the military effort of the United Nations Command in Korea, relieve the hardships of the people of Korea, and develop a stable Korean economy.

(b) It is an objective of the parties to increase the capabilities of the Republic of Korea for economic self-support so far as is possible within the limits of available resources and consistent with the attainment of fiscal and monetary stability.

(c) Successful conduct of military operations against the aggression of the Communists is the primary consideration of the parties. Accordingly, the command prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command are recognized; and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall continue to retain all authority deemed necessary by him for the successful conduct of such operations and the authority to withdraw and to distribute supplies and services furnished under this Agreement in order to meet emergencies arising during the course of military operations or in the execution of civil assistance programs. On the other hand, the prerogatives of the Government of the Republic of Korea are recognized, and the Government of the Republic of Korea shall continue to retain all the authority of a sovereign and independent state.

5. The Board shall make recommendations necessary to insure (a) that the expenses of the Board, and the expenses (i. e., local currency (won) expenses and expenses paid from assistance funds) of all operating agencies established by the Unified Command or the Republic of Korea to carry out assistance programs under this Agreement, shall be kept to the minimum amounts reasonably necessary, and (b) that personnel, funds, equipment, supplies and services provided for assistance purposes are not diverted to other purposes.

ARTICLE II

The Unified Command

The Unified Command undertakes:

1. To support the recommendations of the Board to the extent of the resources made available to the Unified Command.
2. To require the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to designate his representative on the Board and to furnish to the Board such personnel and other necessary administrative support from the United Nations Command as the Board may recommend.
3. To furnish to the Board timely information on all civil assistance programs of the Unified Command and on the status of such programs.
4. Within the limitations of the resources made avail-

able by governments or organizations to the Unified Command, to assist the Republic of Korea in providing for the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter for the population of Korea; for measures to prevent epidemics, disease, and unrest; and for projects which will yield early results in the indigenous production of necessities. Such measures and projects may include the reconstruction and replacement of facilities necessary for relief and support of the civilian population.

5. To ascertain, in consultation with the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the requirement for equipment, supplies, and services for assisting the Republic of Korea.

6. To provide for the procurement and shipment of equipment, supplies, and other assistance furnished by the Unified Command; to supervise the distribution and utilization of this assistance; and to administer such assistance in accordance with the above cited resolutions of the United Nations.

7. To consult with and to utilize the services of the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea, to the greatest extent feasible, in drawing up and implementing plans and programs for assisting the Republic of Korea, including the employment of Korean personnel and the procurement, allocation, distribution and sale of equipment, supplies and services.

8. To carry out the Unified Command program of assistance to the Republic of Korea in such a way as to facilitate the conduct of military operations, relieve hardship, and contribute to the stabilization of the Korean economy.

9. To make available in Korea to authorized representatives of the Government of the Republic of Korea appropriate documents relating to the civil assistance programs of the Unified Command.

ARTICLE III

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea undertakes:

1. To support the recommendations of the Board.

2. To designate the representative of the Republic of Korea on the Board and to furnish to the Board such personnel and other necessary administrative support from the Republic of Korea as the Board may recommend.

3. To furnish to the Board timely information on the economy of Korea and on those activities and plans of the Government of the Republic of Korea pertinent to the functions of the Board.

4. While continuing those measures which the Government of the Republic of Korea has endeavored heretofore to make effective, to take further measures to combat inflation, hoarding, and harmful speculative activities; to apply sound, comprehensive, and adequate budgetary, fiscal, and monetary policies, including maximum collection of revenue; to maintain adequate controls over the extension of public and private credit, to provide requisite and feasible pricing, rationing and allocation controls; to promote wage and price stability; to make most efficient use of all foreign exchange resources; to maximize the anti-inflationary effect that can be derived from relief and other imported essential commodities through effective programming, distribution and sales; to provide the maximum efficiency in utilization of available production facilities; and to maximize production for export.

5. With reference to assistance furnished under this Agreement:

(a) To provide operating agencies which will develop and execute, in consultation with operating agencies of the United Nations Command, programs relating to requirements, allocations, distribution, sale, use and accounting for equipment, supplies and services furnished under this Agreement; to submit to the Board budget estimates of the expenses of such Republic of Korea

agencies; to include such estimates in the national budget; to defray those expenses from the resources available to the Government of the Republic of Korea, including, where the Board so recommends, such funds as may be made available under clause 7d (2) of this article; and to insure that such expenses are kept at a minimum. It is intended that such expenses will be defrayed from the general account revenues of the Republic of Korea when the economy of the Republic of Korea so permits.

(b) To permit the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to exercise such control over assistance furnished hereunder as may be necessary to enable him to exercise his responsibilities under the above cited resolutions of the United Nations.

(c) To achieve maximum sales consistent with relief needs and to be guided by the recommendations of the Board in determining what equipment, supplies, and services are to be distributed free of charge and what are to be sold.

(d) To require Republic of Korea agencies handling equipment and supplies furnished under this Agreement to make and maintain such records and reports as the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, or the Board may consider to be necessary in order to show the import, distribution, sale and utilization of such equipment and supplies.

(e) To impose import duties or charges, or internal taxes or charges, on goods and services furnished by the United Nations Command only as recommended by the Board.

(f) To permit and to assist the authorized representatives of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, freely to inspect the distribution and use of equipment, supplies, or services provided under this Agreement, including all storage and distribution facilities and all pertinent records.

(g) To insure (1) that the people of Korea are informed of the sources and purposes of contributions of funds, equipment, supplies, and services and (2) that all equipment and supplies (and the containers thereof) made available by the Unified Command to the civilian economy of the Republic of Korea, to the extent practicable, as determined by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, are marked, stamped, branded, or labeled in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of such equipment and supplies will permit and in such manner as to indicate to the people of the Republic of Korea the sources and purposes of such supplies.

6. With reference to the assistance furnished under this Agreement which is to be distributed free of charge for the relief of the people of Korea, to insure that the special needs of refugees and other distressed groups of the population are alleviated without discrimination through appropriate public welfare programs.

7. With reference to assistance furnished under this Agreement which is to be sold:

(a) To sell equipment and supplies at prices recommended by the Board, such prices to be those designed to yield the maximum feasible proceeds.

(b) To sell equipment and supplies furnished under this Agreement for cash, unless otherwise recommended by the Board. If the Board should recommend that any such equipment and supplies may be sold to intermediate parties or ultimate users on a credit basis, the amount and duration of such credit shall be no more liberal than that recommended by the Board.

(c) To establish and maintain a special account in the Bank of Korea to which will be transferred the balance now in the "Special United Nations Aid Goods Deposit Account" at the Bank of Korea and to which will be deposited the gross won proceeds of sales of all equipment and supplies (1) furnished under this Agreement or (2) locally procured by expenditure of won funds previously deposited.

(d) To use the special account established in (c) above to the maximum extent possible as a stabilizing device and as an offset to harmful monetary expansion. To this end withdrawals from this account shall be made only upon the recommendation of the Board, only for the following purposes, and only in the following order of priority:

(1) For defraying reasonable local currency costs involved in carrying out the responsibilities of the Unified Command for relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, provided, however, that such local currency expenses shall not include won advances to the United Nations Command for its *bona fide* military expenses or for sale to personnel of the United Nations Command.

(2) For defraying such proportion of the reasonable operating expenses of operating agencies of the Government of the Republic of Korea provided under clause 5 (a) above as may be recommended by the Board.

(3) The balance remaining in this special account, after withdrawals for the above purposes have been made and after provision has been made for an operating reserve, shall periodically upon the recommendation of the Board be applied against any then existing indebtedness of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the Bank of Korea or to any other financial institution organized under the laws of the Republic of Korea.

8. To prevent the export from the Republic of Korea of any of the equipment or supplies furnished by the Unified Command or any items of the same or similar character produced locally or otherwise procured, except upon the recommendation of the Board.

9. To make prudent use of its foreign exchange and foreign credit resources and to utilize these resources to the extent necessary first toward stabilization (by prompt importation into Korea of salable essential commodities) and then toward revitalization and reconstruction of the economy of Korea. The use of such foreign exchange and foreign credit resources shall be controlled or coordinated as follows:

(a) All foreign exchange (both public and private) of the Republic of Korea accruing hereafter from indigenous exports, visible and invisible, except as described in (b) below, shall be controlled solely by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

(b) All foreign exchange (both public and private, and from whatever source acquired) now held by the Republic of Korea and that foreign exchange which, subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement, is derived by the Republic of Korea from any settlement for advances of Korean currency to the United Nations Command shall be used only as recommended by the Board.

(c) All foreign exchange described in (a) and (b) above shall be coordinated by the Board, in order to integrate the use made of such foreign exchange with the imports included in the Unified Command assistance programs.

10. In order properly to adapt the assistance programs of the Unified Command to the needs of the economy of Korea, and in order to coordinate imports under those programs with imports purchased with foreign exchange, to support the recommendations of the Board in making of periodic plans for the import and export of commodities and to use such plans as a basis for the issuance of export and import licenses.

11. In order to make most effective use of the foreign exchange resources of the Government of the Republic of Korea in stabilizing the Korean economy:

(a) To maximize the won proceeds from the sale of such exchange or from the sale of imports derived from such exchange.

(b) To apply such proceeds first against any existing overdrafts of the Government of the Republic of Korea upon the Bank of Korea, except as otherwise recommended by the Board.

(c) To hold or spend the balance of such won proceeds with due regard to the effect of such action on the total money supply.

12. To provide logistic support to the armed forces of the Republic of Korea to the maximum extent feasible and to furnish to the United Nations Command timely information concerning the details of this support in order to permit coordinated budgetary planning.

13. To grant to individuals and agencies of the Unified Command, except Korean nationals, such privileges, immunities, and facilities as are necessary for the fulfillment of their function within the Republic of Korea under the above cited resolutions of the United Nations, or as have been heretofore granted by agreement, arrangement or understanding or as may be agreed upon formally or informally hereafter by the parties or their agencies.

14. To insure that funds, equipment, supplies and services provided by the Unified Command or derived therefrom shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government, except upon recommendation of the Board.

ARTICLE IV

Transfer

1. The parties recognize that all or any portion of the responsibilities of the Unified Command may be assumed from time to time by another agency or agencies of the United Nations. Prior to such transfer, the parties shall consult together concerning any modification in this Agreement which may be required thereby.

2. It is the current expectation of the parties that the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), established by resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 1 December 1950, will assume responsibility for all United Nations relief and rehabilitation activities for Korea at the termination of a period of 180 days following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, as determined by the Unified Command, unless it is determined by the Unified Command, in consultation with the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, that military operations do not so permit at that time, or unless an earlier transfer of responsibility is agreed upon.

ARTICLE V

Existing Agreements

This Agreement does not supersede in whole or in part any existing agreement between the parties hereto.

ARTICLE VI

Registration, Effective Date, and Termination

1. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. This Agreement shall enter into operation and effect immediately upon signature hereto. This Agreement shall remain in force so long as the Unified Command continues in existence and retains responsibilities hereunder, unless earlier terminated by agreement between the parties.

DONE in duplicate in the English and Korean languages, at Pusan, Korea, on this — day of May, 1952. The English and Korean texts shall have equal force, but in case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

For the Government of the Republic of Korea:

For the Government of the United States of America:

Executive Director of Immigration and Naturalization Commission

The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization on September 16 announced the appointment of Harry N. Rosenfield of New York, formerly U.S. Displaced Persons Commissioner, as its Executive Director.

Mr. Rosenfield served for 4 years as a member of the Displaced Persons Commission, by Presidential appointment. The DP's Commission terminated its work on August 31, 1952. Previously, Mr. Rosenfield had been a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Economic and Social Council and assistant to the Federal Security Administrator.

In announcing the appointment, Commission Chairman Philip B. Perlman, former Solicitor General of the United States, said: "The President's Commission is happy to be able to obtain the services of Commissioner Rosenfield as its Executive Director. His familiarity with this general field and his enviable reputation throughout the country will be of great assistance to the Commission in completing its important work within the short time at its disposal."

The Commission was established by the President on September 4, 1952, to "study and evaluate the immigration and naturalization policies of the United States," and was asked for its report by January 1, 1953. The President directed the Commission to give particular attention to the requirements of the immigration law, the admission of immigrants into the United States, and the effect of our immigration laws upon the Nation's foreign relations.

The Commission's first meeting was attended by all seven members, including Vice Chairman Earl G. Harrison and Clarence Pickett of Philadelphia; Rev. Thaddeus F. Gullixson of St. Paul, Minn.; Monsignor John O'Grady, Adrian S. Fisher, and Thomas G. Finucane, all of Washington, D.C.

At the conclusion of its first session on September 17 the Commission will meet with the President at the White House.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Congress of Housing and Urbanization

On September 19 the Department of State announced that the U.S. Government will participate in the twenty-first International Congress of Housing and Urbanization, to be held at Lisbon, September 21-27, 1952. The U.S. delegate will be B. Douglas Stone, International Housing Staff, Housing and Home Finance Agency.

This Congress is one of a series of international

meetings convened by the International Federation of Housing and Town Planning for the purpose of coordinating information on these subjects. The Federation, which is a semigovernmental organization and has consultative status with the United Nations, publishes a quarterly journal containing information on developments in housing in countries all over the world and acts as an international clearing house for information concerning housing.

While the United States is not a member, it has, upon the invitation of the Federation, also participated in several previous meetings of the Congress.

Delegates to the meeting at Lisbon will discuss town planning, housing economics, sanitation, and techniques and methods of using prefabricated materials and other materials not customarily used in house and building construction in the past.

Libya's Application for Admission to U.N.

*Statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin¹
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*

U.S./U.N. press release dated Sept. 16

The repetition of the unrealistic condition laid down in the case of the application of Libya is apparently the only obstruction in the path of the admission of that country, which is a creation of the United Nations. There is no realism in a position such as that to which we have listened today, when we view at the same time document S/2773, a draft resolution concerning the application of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for admission to membership in the United Nations which was submitted by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 15, 1952. Apparently there is no logic in such a position.

Under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the Four Powers agreed in advance that, if the disposition of Libya could not be worked out within a fixed period, they would submit the question to the General Assembly and carry out its recommendations. As we are aware, the fourth regular session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution providing that Libya be constituted an independent and sovereign state, with independence to become effective not later than January 1, 1952. When Libyan independence was proclaimed on December 24, 1951, as I have recalled in the Security Council, my Government announced its strong support for the immediate admission of Libya to membership in this organization. Libya's application for member-

¹ Made in the Security Council on Sept. 16. In the vote the same day, the U.S.S.R. cast its 51st veto to defeat Libya's application for admission.

ship was filed on January 3, 1952, and a few days thereafter—on January 18—Pakistan's draft resolution was put before the Security Council.

Today the members of the Security Council have the opportunity to consider the Libyan application in the light of the Charter. Membership in the United Nations is no more than Libya deserves from this organization, which is so intimately connected with Libya's creation. The United States most warmly supports the application of Libya and will vote in favor of it.

New Member Governments for Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee

The International Materials Conference (Imc) announced on September 17 that Italy, Japan, and Sweden have accepted invitations to be represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee.

This brings to 14 the number of countries now represented on this Committee. They are Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The three new member Governments have designated the following as representatives, alternates, and advisers:

ITALY: Representative

Alberto Baroni, Director, Nickel Information Center, Milan

Alternates

Clemente B. Colonna, Italian Technical Delegation, Washington, D. C.

Gino Cecchi, Italian Minerals Agency (AMMI), Rome

JAPAN: Representative

Ryunji Takeuchi, Minister Plenipotentiary

Alternates

Shoichi Inouye, Commercial Counselor
Keiichi Matsumura, Commercial Secretary
Kiyohiko Tsurumi, Second Secretary

SWEDEN: Representative

Hubert de Besche, Economic Counselor

Alternates

Lennart Masreliez, Commercial Attaché
Baron C. H. von Platen, First Secretary
Anders Forsse, Attaché
Hans Colliander, Attaché

Adviser

Gunnar Lilliekvist, Engineer, AB Avesta, Järnverk, Avesta

Italy is also presently a member of the Central Group and the Copper-Zinc-Lead, Pulp-Paper, Sulphur, and Wool Committees.

Japan is already represented on the Pulp-Paper and Tungsten-Molybdenum Committees of the Imc.

Sweden is represented on the Pulp-Paper, Sulphur, and Tungsten-Molybdenum Committees.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of Information Transmitted by the Government of Belgium. A/2129/Add. 1, Aug. 28, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo; Summary of Information Transmitted by the Government of the Netherlands. A/2132, Aug. 22, 1952. 30 pp. mimeo; Summary of Information Transmitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A/2134/Add. 2, August 1952. 112 pp. mimeo; A/2134/Add. 3, August 1952. 116 pp. mimeo; A/2134/Add. 5, Aug. 18, 1952. 81 pp. mimeo; A/2134/Add. 6, Aug. 1952. 40 pp. mimeo; Summary of General Trends in Territories Under United Kingdom Administration. A/2134/Add. 4, Aug. 18, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo.

Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Franchise of Women and Their Eligibility to Public Office and Functions. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/2154, Aug. 13, 1952. 12 pp. mimeo.

Comments Received From Governments Regarding the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Question of Defining Aggression. A/2162, Aug. 27, 1952. 37 pp. mimeo.

Application of Vietnam for Admission to Membership in the United Nations. Letter dated 7 August 1952 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Vietnam addressed to the Secretary-General. A/2168, Sept. 3, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Trusteeship Council Tenth Session, 27 February to 1 April 1952, Disposition of Agenda Items. T/INF/24, Aug. 13, 1952. 54 pp. mimeo.

Draft Report of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly Covering its Fourth Special Session and its Tenth and Eleventh Sessions (18 December 1951 to . . . July 1952). Prepared by the Secretariat. T/L. 307, July 18, 1952. 61 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[Sept. 15-26, 1952]

Security Council

Admission of New Members—The Council, on September 12, voted to consider directly, without referral to its Committee on the Admission of New Members, the applications of Libya, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia for membership in the United Nations.

On September 16, the Council voted 10-1 (U.S.S.R.) on the Pakistan proposal to recommend the admission of Libya. The draft resolution was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

Jacob A. Malik (U.S.S.R.), in explaining his negative vote, declared that, although his Government favored the admission of Libya, it was opposed to the admission of "favorites" of the United States and its supporters alone, while states equally qualified for membership were rejected.¹

The application of Japan was considered at meetings on September 17 and 18. Ten members of the Council spoke in favor of the United States draft resolution calling upon the Council to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of Japan.

Warren R. Austin (U.S.) said that the "great nation" of Japan had succeeded in establishing a new structure of government and leadership versed in the ways of freedom and peace. Japan was a sovereign and independent state and already had "a long history of cooperation in many areas with the United Nations," he declared. The United States was "proud to recognize Japan's return to the international community of nations."

The vote on the admission of Japan, taken September 18, was 10-1 (U.S.S.R.). Mr. Malik, in explaining his stand, said that Japan was not an independent and sovereign state but "an American colony" and an American base for aggression in Korea and the Far East.

Mr. Austin, in commenting on some of the charges made by Mr. Malik, stated in part:

What Mr. Malik calls a separate peace treaty is a treaty with Japan signed by 48 states, all members of the United Nations or applicants for membership. . . . If the U.S.S.R. is still at war with Japan it is the choice of the U.S.S.R. Incidentally, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan but six days before the cessation of hostilities.

¹ For statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin on Libya's application for admission, see p. 502.

The Soviet Union refused to become a party to the peace settlement with Japan reached at San Francisco. Efforts of the United States to consult with the U.S.S.R. were rebuffed during the preliminary stages of negotiations which led to the draft peace treaty. The U.S.S.R. sent a delegation to San Francisco ostensibly to be present on the occasion of signing the treaty. In fact, this delegation attempted to obstruct the conclusion of the treaty which, as I have said before, was signed by 48 states. . . .

The Soviet charges that Japan is undemocratic, that it is being tyrannized by the United States, and that its sovereignty is subject to United States control and therefore ineligible for membership in the United Nations have already been repudiated by the members of the Security Council who spoke yesterday in favor of Japan's admission to the United Nations.

The unity of ten out of the eleven members of the Security Council increases the strength and moral power of those countries of the world which believe the gospel of the Charter of the United Nations.

The applications of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were considered together at meetings on September 18 and 19. Votes were taken separately on September 19 on the three draft resolutions submitted by France to recommend the admission of the three states. The result on each was 10-1 (U.S.S.R.).

In support of the applications of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Mr. Austin (U.S.) cited concrete ways in which each of these states has shown its desire "to make constructive contributions to the United Nations and to the principles of the Charter." He pointed out that all three are members of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the Universal Postal Union, and that Vietnam is also a member of the International Labor Organization.

Each of these states is also an associate member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Furthermore, Vietnam has made or pledged contributions to the United Nations program for Korea, Palestine, and technical assistance. Cambodia has made or pledged its contributions for Korea and technical assistance.

Later, on September 19, a vote was taken on the Soviet draft resolution recommending the admission of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for admission to membership. The vote, taken by a show of hands, was 10-1 (U.S.S.R.).

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities—The Subcommission began discussions September 22 on the question of what further action the United Nations should take to help reduce prejudice and remove discrimination. A resolution adopted at the last General Assembly session declared that these are "two of the most important branches of the positive work undertaken by the United Nations" and requested the Subcommission to propose practical steps to continue this work within the framework of the United Nations.

Among the subjects under discussion are discrimination in employment, in education, in residence and movement, in political rights, in immigration and travel, and in the right to choose a spouse. The Subcommission will recommend to the Economic and Social Council which of these studies should be initiated.

Members were elected by Ecosoc to serve in their individual capacity as experts and not as representatives of their governments. Jonathan Daniels is the United States member. Other countries represented are India, Haiti, Ecuador, China, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, Belgium, Iran, and Poland.

At their first meeting, the experts sustained a ruling of the former chairman, M. R. Masani of India, that the Soviet proposal to unseat the Chinese expert was out of order. The vote was 8-2 (Poland, U.S.S.R.)-1 (India). H. Roy of Haiti was elected chairman of the fifth session.

In a statement at the second meeting, on September 23, Mr. Daniels observed that the Subcommission's past reports had been largely disregarded and that its work had not had an impact on the mind of the world. At this session, he advised, the Subcommission must demonstrate that it has "some relationship to reality."

General Assembly

As the result of a drawing held September 23 in the Secretary-General's office, the delegation of the U.S.S.R. to the seventh General Assembly opening at New York October 14 will occupy the first position in the front row of the Assembly Hall, to the right of the President as he faces the delegates.

The other 59 delegations will be seated in alphabetical order.

Committee on Administrative Unions—The Committee at its first meeting September 23 elected A. D. Mani of India as chairman. Its function is to consider questions arising from the joint administration of a United Nations trust territory with neighboring territories in customs, fiscal, or administrative fields, in order to enable the General Assembly to arrive at conclusions as to whether such administrative arrangements are compatible with the United Nations Charter and the trusteeship agreements.

The Committee has before it a comprehensive report, already adopted by the Trusteeship Council, which analyzes administrative unions affecting certain trust territories. It is to submit its observations to the forthcoming General Assembly session.

Members in addition to the chairman are William I. Cargo (U.S.), Jacques Houard (Belgium), and Carlos Calero Rodriques (Brazil).

Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories—In the course of the Committee's discussion of economic conditions in non-self-governing territories, William Cargo (U.S.) declared that the principles embodied in the Committee's 1950 report on education and its 1951 report on economic development coincide in general with the principles which the United States strived to attain in its territories. The United States Government, he said, would keep the Committee informed of developments relating to the special reports.

Mr. Cargo repudiated criticisms made by the Soviet representative. He pointed out that the Committee's special report on economic development recognized that considerable financial help to the non-self-governing territories was being provided by the metropolitan countries by loans or other forms of controlled investment.

This was true of the territories administered by the United States, Mr. Cargo said, and he was sure that it applied equally to other territories.

On September 16 the Committee completed discussion of economic conditions and began to discuss the main item before the present session—social conditions in non-self-governing territories. Speaking for the United States, Mason Barr, its special adviser on social matters, on September 17 described the progress achieved in the United States territories and the aid extended by the Federal Government. In connection with local programs, he spoke of the policy of matching the funds called for, dollar for dollar, sometimes three for one, with Federal aid. He also described the progress achieved in the fields of social security, old-age pensions, vocational training, and housing. In Puerto Rico, for instance, he said that 60 percent of the total budget was spent on education, health, and public welfare.

At the meeting on September 23, Henry Holle, special adviser to the United States delegation, cited the improvement in birth and death rates in the six U.S.-administered territories. He noted that research was carried on at the governmental level and through special grants which amounted to \$23,000,000 in 1951. During this same year these grants per capita had been five times greater in the territories than in the United States itself, he pointed out. The shortage of personnel, a foremost problem, would take time to solve, he added; in this connection, he called attention to the United States officials engaged in raising health standards throughout the world.

Economic Development Program Recommended for Nicaragua

Recommendations for a 5-year program for the economic development of Nicaragua were made public on September 16 in the report of a mission sent to Nicaragua under the joint sponsorship of the Government of Nicaragua and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The mission's report was presented in Managua to Anastasio Somoza, President of the Republic of Nicaragua, by Robert L. Garner, Vice President of the International Bank.

In organizing this mission, the Bank departed from its usual procedure of sending a group of experts for 2 or 3 months and instead stationed two members of its staff in Nicaragua from July 1951 to May 1952. The mission was headed by E. Harrison Clark as special representative, with Walter J. Armstrong as engineering adviser. Specialists in various fields went to Nicaragua to assist in the work. In addition, the International Monetary Fund sent a mission on banking and credit.

The mission's objectives were to assist the government in the preparation of an over-all long-range development program, to advise the government on current economic policies as well as improvement in the existing administrative and financial structure to prepare the way for such a development program, and to coordinate the work of experts from the Bank and other agencies and to assist the government in carrying out their recommendations.

From its extensive travel in the country, the Bank's mission concluded that—

few underdeveloped countries have so great a physical potential for growth and economic development as does Nicaragua. By making effective use of its resources, the country can become, in the future, an important exporter of meat and dairy products and of a diversified list of other agricultural products. It should continue as a producer of timber and minerals. It should develop a sound and well-balanced relationship between industry and agriculture.

The mission found that the Government of Nicaragua was fully aware of the needs of the country and desired to push ahead with economic development. In line with recommendations of the mission, the Government already has (a) brought into operation a National Economic Council to coordinate the development effort; (b) completed plans for a National Development Institute to plan and finance the long-range agricultural and industrial program; (c) undertaken a sharp increase in development expenditures to go into effect in 1952-53; (d) taken steps for a major fiscal reform, including the proposed introduction of an income tax, more effective enforcement of existing direct taxes, and a revision of the tariff system. Other measures, undertaken before the mission's arrival, have resulted in increased internal financial stability.

The program formulated by the mission is designed to help the country move forward simultaneously in health, education, transportation, agriculture, industry, and power. The program aims within the next 5 years to increase real per capita income by 15 percent and to increase the physical volume of agricultural and industrial production by 25 percent.

The population is small in relation to the area of the country, and as development proceeds labor shortages may occur in some sectors of the economy. The mission believes, however, that modern industrial and agricultural techniques can offset this handicap.

The mission lists the following specific objectives:

(a) completion of a major highway network (now being constructed under a Bank loan) linking Managua with Granada, León, Chinandega, Jinotega, San Juan del Sur, the Tuma Valley and with the east coast; (b) establishment of a complete network of farm-to-market roads; (c) modernization of the railway; (d) rehabilitation of the major ocean ports and improvement of lake transportation; (e) establishment of pure water and sanitation facilities in the main towns and many of the smaller communities; (f) expansion of the present power capacity of Managua to triple its present size and formation of a network to connect with other important cities; (g) increasing the number of coffee trees by 25 percent and expansion of cattle production to the status of a major industry; (h) establishment of several new industries, as well as a number of grain-storage plants; (i) reduction in the rate of illiteracy and a rise in vocational and technical education and training; (j) creation of an adequate medium and long-term credit system and technical assistance for industry and agriculture.

The mission recommends a minimum program of investment of 59 million dollars and an optimum program of 76 million dollars during the period 1952-57. Under either program, about half the expenditures would be in foreign exchange. The mission believes that these investment goals are within the capacity of the country.

The mission found that in every sector of the economy high disease rates, low standards of nutrition, and low educational and training standards are the major factors inhibiting the growth of productivity. Farm mechanization, improved transportation, and modern industrial machinery will increase total production, but this increase will be limited unless there is basic improvement in the health and living conditions of the country's limited working population. Community

Corrections

BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 245. The italic sentence, under the heading "German Elections Commission Adjourns Indefinitely," should read as follows: *The following was released to the press at Geneva on August 5 by the United Nations Information Center.*

BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 385. Last sentence of footnote 1 should read: See p. 390.

action in cooperation with government agencies is suggested to meet the twin problems of health and education.

In the agricultural sector, the mission's first recommendation is that coffee production be increased, in view of the quality of the crop and the favorable conditions for cultivation. The mission believes that production should be raised both by new plantings and by improved management of existing plantings. The program for agriculture would also provide for improvement and expansion of the cattle industry, increased production of vegetable oils, organization of a soil-conservation program, construction of additional crop-storage capacity, development of irrigation, initiation of land-use studies, and establishment of a forestry service.

New industries recommended include milk-concentration and pasteurization plants, modern slaughterhouses, vegetable-oil processing plants, and a small feed-mixing plant. Further study may show that such industries as hardboard mills and wire-products manufacture are possible. The pressing need for textile processing facilities is now being filled through private investment.

The report points out that although hydroelectric-power development is possible, the basic technical data is lacking. The present urgent power needs should be filled through the installation of steam-generating facilities until such time as it is possible to develop hydroelectric resources.

Wherever it went, the mission found impressive evidence of development stimulated by the building of roads. Whole areas once isolated from the capital now trade with it daily, and a considerable amount of international freight is now being hauled on the Inter-American Highway. Many regions, however, are still dependent upon slow and expensive methods of transporting crops to market. Since rapid economic gains may be expected from the opening of these regions, the mission puts major emphasis on the completion of the primary highway system as well as a network of farm-to-market roads.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Admission of 300,000 Immigrants. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on H.R. 7376, A Bill To Authorize the Issuance of Three Hundred Thousand Special Nonquota Immigration Visas to Certain Refugees, Persons of German Ethnic Origin, and Natives of Italy, Greece, and the Netherlands, and for Other Purposes. May 22, 23, June 2, and 3, 1952. Serial No. 17. Committee print. 232 pp.

Federal Supply Management (Overseas Survey). Conferences Held by a Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (name changed to Committee on Government Operations, July 4, 1952), House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, Nov. 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, and 28, 1951. Committee print. 1463 pp.

Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Part 12. March 28, 29, 31, and Apr. 1, 1952. Committee print. 322 pp.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Alfred H. Morton as Head of the Voice of America, effective October 1.

Parker T. Hart as Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, effective June 18.

Clarke L. Willard as Chief, Division of International Conferences, effective July 15.

John W. Ford as Chief, Division of Security, effective July 21.

Edward S. Maney as Chief, Visa Division, effective Aug. 30.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

John M. Cabot as Ambassador to Pakistan; effective September 17.

Jack K. McFall as Minister to Finland, effective September 10.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 15-19, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Sept. 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 711 of Sept. 9 and 727 of Sept. 12.

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732	9/15	Soviet propaganda on germ warfare
*733	9/16	Exchange of persons
*734	9/16	Exchange of persons
†735	9/16	Civil aviation organization
736	9/17	Acheson: European unity
*737	9/17	Exchange of persons
738	9/17	Cabot: Ambassador to Pakistan
†739	9/18	Pt. 4 aid to Iran on division of land
740	9/19	Housing and urbanization congress
741	9/19	Proclamation of Venezuelan agreement
742	9/19	Swiss estate tax convention

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